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The IT age is marked by innovative approaches to the online com-
merce. Technology as the core of innovation has undergone numerous evolu-
tions through the “creative destruction.” Motivated by the phenomena and
the challenges in the technology-driven markets, I explore the economic role
of innovation from different angles in the following essays.
Chapter 1 focuses on firms’ competitive strategies while constructing
novel business models in delivering online services. In particular, I am in-
terested in their bundling of marketing services with the core business. In
a game theoretic model, I derive competing firms’ equilibrium strategies with
choices between three business models, no ad-support, ad-support with the op-
tional advertising strategy, and the mandatory advertising strategy, and find
that competitive business models can be differentiation-driven or advertising-
driven depending on market ad aversion. Interestingly, mandatory advertising
weakly dominates optional advertising under certain market conditions. My
findings offer new insights to the bundling literature.
vi
Chapter 2 examines the performance-based auction model in the iconic
online advertising innovation, keyword auctions. I analyze advertisers’ decision
of utilizing their existing reputation from a primary auction upon entering a
new auction. The short-term and long-term setups are modeled for analyzing
seasonal marketing in a new auction and branding a new product, in exam-
ining the impact of new market size, performance, and risk on advertisers’
decisions. While an optimistic new market encourages reputation stretching,
in the long-term setup it further depends on the performance difference be-
tween the two markets. A higher risk is found to induce stretching under
intensive competition for both cases; in the long-term, stretching decision is
determined by the market size.
Chapter 3 examines the connection between business cycles and inno-
vation and offers insights for regulatory innovation policies. Combining en-
dogenous market structure with the dynamic game framework, I study the
Markov perfect equilibrium where heterogeneous firms choose their innovation
rates. I find that increased per-capita income tends to improve aggregate in-
novation, while income inequality shocks may reduce innovation conditional
on the market structure. I also find subsidies to dampen innovation incentives,
and policies such as tax credits that reduce the variable R&D costs to have
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Chapter 1
Competitive Strategies in Business Model
Innovation
1.1 Introduction
Successful innovations have generated many insightful discussions fo-
cused on the technology aspect. While the fundamental technology is a key
component in any innovation, the solution provided to the consumers must be
delivered to the market with an effective business model that generates prof-
itable returns [3]. For example, Apple’s success in introducing iPod does not
only reside in its elegant designs and attractive product attributes; the over-
whelming market popularity is largely owing to Apple’s business model that
combines the mp3 player with iTunes online music store [25]. In this paper, we
examine a current area of innovation, online service provision, where business
models are flourishing with variant advertising mechanisms. We analyze firms’
strategic decisions of adopting advertising support for constructing profitable
business models under the forces of market competition and consumers’ taste
for advertisements.
In the emergence of Cloud computing, the innovative ways of deliver-
ing services has had a significant impact on the traditional businesses, such
1
as those in media and software. YouTube has made agreements with studio
partners such as CBS and MGM to provide TV network programs in addition
to its user-generated contents [42]. A joint venture launched in 2007 by NBC
Universal and News Corp, Hulu, is experiencing rapid growth both in content
provision and user base, offering numerous high-quality hit TV programs and
films online. Netflix, which is known for renting DVD movies by mail, is mak-
ing more movies available for online streaming. Meanwhile, the sales of DVDs
have declined significantly, which has triggered companies such as Disney to
turn their investment to the Web-based entertainment [5].
This shift of business paradigm to a service-based model in a networked
environment creates challenges for the competing firms. The difference be-
tween the contents provided by YouTube, Hulu, and Netflix is transitory as
these competitors strive to meet the viewers’ demand. The competing business
models defined by elaborate advertising strategies through agile technologies
and rich interactivity, are providing otherwise substitutable digital products
with an opportunity to create differentiation through advertising options, as
consumers’ heterogeneous ad taste is highly susceptible to ad presentation and
contexts.
Advertising has undergone substantial transformation in the past few
decades owing to the digitization of advertising channels. Consequently, ad-
vertisers’ wasted marketing expense and advertising nuisance experienced by
users are both declining. YouTube displays the minimizable in-video ads po-
litely on the bottom of the screen. Compared to television, Hulu delivers TV
2
programs with fewer commercial interruptions and with other customization
features. A recent survey showed high user satisfaction on Hulu for the amount
and quality of commercials shown in the videos (The New York Times, 2008).
Leading advertising platforms such as Google and Yahoo! revolutionized ad-
vertising by implementing auction-based ranking and specifying a pay-per-click
contingent payment contract with advertisers [31]. There is a variety of adver-
tising models, but for the tractability of the current analysis, we divide them
into two categories, optional and mandatory advertising. With optional ad-
vertising, the ad-averse users are able to eliminate nuisance (e.g., dismissable
ads in YouTube videos described above). As a result, ads do not have any
negative impact on users’ experience. With mandatory advertising, users can-
not disregard or disable ads. The ad-averse users’ experience is then affected
negatively; the experience of the users who value ads is elevated. For exam-
ple, Hulu employs mandatory advertising by not allowing users to fast-forward
through commercials, users’ experience is then affected by their personal tastes
for Hulu ads.
We model a duopoly setting, where the competing firms face strategic
choices of offering their services without ad-support, with mandatory or op-
tional advertising. Observing consumers’ taste for ads, in equilibrium firms
may have different strategic aims in constructing their business models - differ-
entiation driven or advertising revenue driven. In a strongly ad-averse market,
the equilibrium is differentiation driven: A firm can sustain a profitable market
position with mandatory advertising, while the competing firm implements ei-
3
ther of the other two strategies. In this way, ad-aversion is leveraged to create
differentiation and mitigate price competition. In a moderately or mildly ad-
averse market, the equilibrium strategies further depend on the profitability
of advertising support, since firms have less leverage from market ad-aversion.
At a high level of ad revenue, firms’ equilibrium strategies are advertising-
driven where both firms adopting advertising support, even with significant
ad-aversion. Our findings underscore the point that business model innova-
tions occur in a competitive landscape, where firms need to examine the key
market attributes with a strategic lens.
We approach the problem with a bundling setup viewing ad-supported
service as a bundle of service and advertisements. Mandatory advertising is
equivalent to pure bundling (or fixed bundling) such that only the bundle,
the ad-supported service, is available to consumers. The interpretation of op-
tional advertising has the flavor of mixed bundling - consumers are choosing
between the service alone and the service with ads. However, while in mixed
bundling different prices are assigned to the bundle options, in the context
of advertising technology, uniform pricing is more appropriate, because users’
choice of ad option and their resultant experience are realized ex post, making
it unfit for the ad-supported firm to assign multiple prices. Our framework ex-
tends from classic bundling literature by encapsulating unique characteristics
of advertisements not applicable to traditional goods. Bundling advertise-
ments creates a potential additional revenue source for the firm. The analysis
illustrates that the ad revenue in some cases suppresses equilibrium prices by
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inducing ad-supported firms to compete more aggressively. The effect of this
revenue source combined with other properties in our model yield findings
different from those of the past bundling literature.
In Section 1.2, we review the related literature. Section 1.3 presents
the model. In Section 1.4 we present the analysis in two duopoly scenarios:
1) One firm is ad-supported and chooses between optional and mandatory
advertising, and the other firm is assumed to not adopt advertising; and 2)
both firms adopt an ad-support. These cases are consisted of the subgames
of the entire problem. These analyses illustrate the subgame equilibria given
different competition configurations and lead to the final equilibrium results.
In Section 1.5, we obtain these equilibrium strategies and evaluate the welfare
implication. We discuss the relaxation of the key assumptions in Section 1.6.
And then we conclude.
1.2 Literature Review
The keyword auction literature has shown the efficiency of performance-
based auction over the traditional second-price auction in ranking advertise-
ments [10] [28] [30] [46]. Our research takes the angle from the perspective
of business model competition when adopting an advertising support. Adver-
tising has traditionally been studied as a firm’s strategy to increase consumer
demand and price discriminate by promoting its own product [7] [13] [22]. Iyer
et al. studied the effect of targeted advertising on firms’ marketing and pricing
decisions in a competitive environment, and found that by advertising only to
5
certain segments of consumers, firms are able to eliminate costs of ineffective
advertising and improve profits [24]. In our work, advertising does not pro-
mote the firm’s own product, but adds content to the service while financing
the firm. Nevertheless, our results connect with Iyer et al.’s findings in that
optional advertising in our context can create intense price competition as
targeted advertising in their setting has the same effect.
As previously discussed, an ad-supported firm effectively bundles adver-
tisements with its product. Firms bundle to reduce cost or price discriminate,
and can use bundling as a competitive tool [19]. In bundling as a competi-
tion tool, Chen studied firms using bundling to differentiate their products
and reduce price competition [11]. While mixed bundling is the dominant
strategy in a monopoly case, Chen showed that it is weakly dominated in a
duopoly, which parallels our equilibrium results in the case where both firms
are ad-supported [11]. Contrasting with Chen (1997), which found that mixed
bundling is weakly dominated by unbundling, we find optional advertising
can be dominated by mandatory advertising. And we also show that no ad-
support (analogous to unbundling) does not dominate any strategy due to that
its equilibrium price is suppressed by the rival’s ad revenue.
Fan et al. studied a firm’s pricing decisions in the context of online
media with an advertising option [15]. Their formulation focuses more on the
monopoly pricing strategy of ad-supported and ad-free media products. Our
approach is more oriented towards the advertising strategy in a competitive




Consider a duopoly market, where two firms produce perfectly substi-
tutable services, for which consumers have homogeneous valuation with the
reservation price r. Assume consumers have unit demand, and r is sufficiently
large such that the market is covered. The firms have zero marginal cost.
Firms may acquire advertising support. The consumer valuation for the
advertisements, θ, is characterized by the uniform distribution, θ ∼ U [α, α+1],
where α ≥ −1 (i.e., at least some consumers value ads positively), and denoted
by the cdf G(θ). An ad-supported firm derives marginal advertising revenue
of β ∈ (0, 1) from consumers with θ > 0. Here the implicit assumption is
that firms offer contingent payment contracts to the advertisers such that
payments are only collected when ads attract users. Thus, consumers who
dislike ads are unlikely to click on the ads and are assumed to not contribute
to firm’s advertising revenues. Consumers’ utility function for firm i’s service
with advertisements at price pi is
ui(pi) = r − pi + θ. (1.1)
In the first stage, firms choose between competing without advertising
support (N), with optional advertising (O), and with mandatory advertising
(M). And then they engage in price competition. The timeline of the game is
as follows:
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1. Firms choose from strategies ad-support with optional advertising (O),
ad-support with mandatory advertising (M), and no ad-support (N);
2. Firms compete in price;
3. Consumers make purchase decisions;
4. Profits are realized.
There are nine pricing games corresponding to nine possible strategy
combinations, among which strategy set (N,N) has a Bertrand outcome with
both firms pricing at zero and making zero profits. In the following section, we
break down the analysis of the other eight pricing games into two duopolies.
In the former case exactly one firm does not adopt advertising support and the
competing firm chooses between the advertising strategies, while in the latter
case both firms adopt ad-support. Examining these two settings individually
allows us to gain additional insights in specific competitive scenarios. Based
on the results derived, we analyze the equilibrium strategies in the first stage
in Section 1.5.
1.4 Duopoly Analysis
1.4.1 No-Ad and Ad-Supported Business Models
In this section, without loss of generality, only firm 2 is supported by
advertising. Firm 2 chooses between the mandatory and optional advertising
strategies. We will solve for the equilibrium price in the subgame under each
8
strategy, and then obtain the dominant strategy.
No-Ad vs. Mandatory Advertising - (N,M)
When firm 2 chooses the mandatory advertising strategy, consumers’
preference between firm 1’s service and firm 2’s service with ads depends on the
prices as well as their valuation for ads. Based on Equation (1.1), a consumer




G(p2 − p1), if p1 ≤ r.
0, if p1 > r.
The profit functions of the two firms are,
π1(p1, p2) = G(p2 − p1) ∗ p1 (1.2)
π2(p2, p1) = (1−G(p2 − p1)) ∗ p2 (1.3)
+β ∗min{1−G(p2 − p1), 1 + α}.
Firm 2 will obtain the consumers on the upper end of the valuation
continuum, and firm 1 the rest. The relative price levels will only determine
to which side of θ = 0 the market split occurs. That is, when firm 2 charges
a lower price than firm 1, it will have all consumers with positive θ as well
as some with negative θ, while by charging a higher price firm 2 will not get
any ad-averse consumers and lose some favor-ad consumers to firm 1. The
following lemma summarizes the equilibrium prices and profits at different
values of α.
9














≤ α ≤ −1
2







(1− β) < α < 1− β p∗2 = 13(2 + α− 2β)
†
p∗1 = 0
α ≥ 1− β p∗2 = α†
Note: The larger value is marked with †.
Lemma 1.4.1. For the subgame of the strategy set (N,M), the equilibrium
prices and profits are shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Proposition 1.4.2. For the subgame of strategy set (N,M), p∗1 > p
∗
2 if α < −12 ,
and p∗1 ≤ p∗2 otherwise (see Figure 1.1); π∗2 > π∗1 iff α > 12+3β − 1.
When α is very small (i.e., α < −1
2
), the ad-averse consumer segment
is large. Under mandatory strategy, firm 2 must charge a lower price than firm
1 to attract some of these consumers while getting the consumers who favor
10
















≤ α ≤ −1
2







(1− β) < α < 1− β π∗2 = 19(2 + α + β)
2†
π∗1 = 0
α ≥ 1− β π∗2 = α + β†
Note: The larger value is marked with †.
Figure 1.1: Equilibrium Prices for Strategy Set (N,M)
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ads. And firm 2 makes a higher profit than firm 1 only when β, the marginal
revenue for advertising, is sufficiently large.
For all other values of α, firm 2 obtains a higher equilibrium profit
relative to firm 1. For −1
2
≤ α ≤ −1
2
(1 − β), two firms set identical prices
in equilibrium. Thus, a consumer’s choice of firm is determined solely on
her valuation for advertisements. As a result, firm 2 gets all consumers with
positive θ and firm 1 gets the rest. When the consumer segment that value
ads is sufficiently large, firm 2 is willing to give up all ad-averse consumers as
well as some favor-ad consumers by charging a higher price than firm 1, and
still obtain a higher profit. When α is large enough or advertising is profitable
enough, firm 2 can push firm 1’s price and profit to zero.
No-Ad vs. Optional Advertising - (N,O)
When firm 2 undertakes the optional strategy, the consumers who have
positive valuation for ads get the service with ads; and the consumers who
have negative valuation for ads are able to eliminate the disutility from ads,
in effect, receive ad-free service from firm 2. The firms compete only in price
for ad-averse consumers.
Consumer chooses firm 1
{
if p1 < p2, for θ < 0.
θ < p2 − p1, for θ > 0.
Lemma 1.4.3. The subgame equilibrium for the strategy set (N,O) is as fol-
lows,
1) For α ≤ −1
2
(1− β), p∗1 = p∗2 = 0, π∗1 = 0, and π∗2 = β(1 + α);
12
Figure 1.2: Equilibrium Prices for Strategy Set (N,O)
2) For α > −1
2
(1−β), the equilibrium is identical to the subgame of the strategy
set (N,M).
Comparing figures 1.1 and 1.2, the difference between the two cases
resides in the smaller values of α, where in the optional case both firms price
at 0 as in a Bertrand competition. At α = −1
2
(1−β), the number of ad-averse
consumers is small enough such that firm 2 is only concerned with competing
for consumers who value ads, which is consistent with the mandatory case
since the option to disable ads is irrelevant for these consumers.
Firm 2’s Strategy Choice
Proposition 1.4.4. In the subgame with a no-ad firm competing with an ad-
supported firm, mandatory advertising is a weakly dominant strategy. For
α ≤ −1
2
(1− β), mandatory advertising strategy yields a higher profit for firm
13
2, both firms obtain positive profits; For other values of α, firm 2 is indifferent
between the two strategies.
By making advertisements mandatory, firm 2 differentiates its service
from firm 1’s service for all consumers, which allows firm 1 to obtain profits
from the ad-averse group.
1.4.2 Ad-Supported Competition
In this section, we analyze the symmetric game where both firms have
the ad-supported business model and bundle their services with advertise-
ments. Assume consumers are indifferent between the advertisements provided
by two firms.
Identical Advertising Strategies - (M,M) or (O,O)
Consider the case where both firms choose mandatory advertising (M,M).
A consumer’s utility for either firm is Equation (1.1). Clearly, the valuation
for advertising has no effect here–she will simply purchase from the firm with
the lower price. Thus, the Bertrand competition yields the subgame equilib-
rium with both firms charging zero price and splitting the advertising revenue,
assuming that each firm captures half of the market and makes equal profits






When both firms sell their services with optional advertising (O,O),
consumers with negative valuation have the utility function, u(pi) = r − pi,
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while consumers with positive valuation still follow Equation (1.1). The sub-
game exhibits perfect symmetry when the firms adopt identical strategies.
Thus, the equilibrium results are the same in both (M,M) and (O,O) cases.
Proposition 1.4.5. In the subgame of the strategy set (M,M) or (O,O), in
equilibrium, p∗1 = p
∗








If prices are not non-negative, the equilibrium profits will be zero with
firms charging equal and negative prices. Negative pricing can be reflected
in rewards, coupons, credits, or other forms of “payment” offered to the con-
sumers in the transaction. For simplicity, we take the non-negative pricing
assumption, while our findings will still hold if this assumption is to be relaxed.
Different Advertising Strategies - (M,O)
Now we consider the case where firms choose different strategies. With-
out loss of generality, let firm 2 undertake optional advertising. For the con-
sumers with positive valuation for ads, both firms display advertisements, and
consumers will choose the firm with a lower price. For the consumers with
negative valuation for ads,
u1(p1) = r − p1 + θ, if purchase from firm 1.
u2(p2) = r − p2, if purchase from firm 2.
Consumers’ preference follows:
Consumer chooses firm 1
{
if p1 < p2, for θ ≥ 0.
θ > p1 − p2, for θ < 0.
15
Figure 1.3: Equilibrium Prices for Strategy Set (M,O)
The firms’ profit functions are
π1(p1, p2) =

(1−G(p1 − p2))p1 + β(1 + α), if p1 < p2;
1
2
(β + p1)(1 + α), if p1 = p2;
0, if p1 > p2;
π2(p1, p2) =

G(p1 − p2)p2, if p1 < p2.
1
2
(β + p2)(1 + α) + (−α)p2, if p1 = p2.
p2 + β(1 + α), if p1 > p2.
Lemma 1.4.6. The subgame equilibrium for the strategy set (M,O) is as fol-
lows:
















2) For α ≥ −1
2
, p∗1 = p
∗








When the number of ad-averse consumers is large (i.e., α < −1
2
), firms
2 charges a higher price than firm 1, who in turn obtains some ad-averse
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consumers. Intuitively, firm 2 gets enough market share from the ad-averse
consumers so that it is willing to forgo the split of the rest of the market with
firm 1 by raising its price above that of firm 1. For larger α values, both firms
price at zero and split the profits.
The competition here reverses that of the no-ad versus ad-supported
case with the ad-supported firm choosing optional advertising. In the that
setup, Bertrand competition occurs for the ad-averse consumers because they
get ad-free services from both firms, while here the firms offer identical bundles
(service with ads) for consumers who favor ads. Also, firm 2 gets the higher-
value consumers in the previous case, but the lower-value consumers in the
current scenario. The cutoff α value that separates the two sets of equilibrium
prices, p∗1 = p
∗




1, is weighted by (1 − β) in the previous case.
This implies that firm 2 needs a larger consumer segment that it gets for sure
in the previous case than in the current case to forgo the part of the market it
can split with the other firm. It appears counterintuitive, because the portion
of consumers that prefer firm 2’s service in the previous case are those who like
ads and can generate revenues not just by purchasing the service but also by
interacting with the advertisements, while in the mirror-image of the current
case, that part of market is made up of consumers who dislike ads and do not
contribute to firm 2’s advertising revenue. Thus, firm 2 is seemingly “greedier”
in the no-ad versus ad-supported case.
The explanation behind the above observation is that advertising rev-
enue can dampen the differentiation effect and lower the equilibrium prices.
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When the firm obtaining the higher-value consumers also derives revenues from
advertising, its competitive behaviors are more sensitive to the demand change;
the stimulated incentives to gain higher market shares end up driving down the
equilibrium prices. The implication is that when consumer segment is heavier
on the favor-ad side, the firm without an ad support has a smaller leeway to
differentiate and charge a positive price than the mandatory ad-support firm
does when the ad-averse consumer segment is more dominant.
Comparing the scenario here with the no-ad firm competing with ad-
support firm case when the ad-supported firm chooses mandatory advertising,
the equilibrium prices for α < −1
2
are the same, but here firms charge price
0 for larger α values. Note that the competition for ad-averse consumers is
exactly the same for the two cases. As a result, at the same α value in both
cases the firm offering its service without ads raises its price above that of the
other firm.
Advertising Strategy Choice
Proposition 1.4.7. In the subgame with both firms being ad-supported, in
equilibrium, for α < −1
2
, one firm chooses optional advertising strategy, and
the other one chooses mandatory advertising; For α ≥ −1
2
, both firms choose
either optional or mandatory advertising strategy.
When both firms are ad-supported, choosing the same advertising strat-
egy creates Bertrand competition. Therefore, in this subgame equilibrium, the
18
two firms choose different strategies to differentiate their services. The firm
that undertakes optional advertising charges a higher price than the manda-
tory firm and loses the favor-ad consumer segment to the mandatory firm.
The comparison of the profits, however, depends on the marginal advertising
revenue. From Proposition 3 and Lemma 3, we see that in the case α ≥ −1
2
,





β(1 + α)). Thus, for heavier
favor-ad consumer segment, both firms select any of the advertising options.
1.5 Equilibrium Results
We now analyze two firms’ strategies among the choices of no ad sup-
port, mandatory and optional advertising. From the previous section, the
firms’ equilibrium strategy choices are dependent on the value of α and also
partially on β. The equilibrium in this section suggests that the successful
innovations in a competitive environment need different aims given particular
market characteristics such as consumers’ overall taste.
1.5.1 Strong Ad-Aversion
Lemma 1.5.1. When α < −1
2
, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria include (N,M)
and (M,O)1: two firms choose either i) no advertising support and mandatory
advertising, or ii) mandatory and optional advertising. The equilibrium strate-
gies in the case of strongly ad-aversion is differentiation-driven.
1The complete set of pure-strategy Nash Equilibria actually also includes (M,N) and
(O,M) due to the symmetry of the game. For presentation simplicity, we omit listing sym-
metric strategies for all results in this section.
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Given a large consumer segment that is ad-averse, the competing firms
leverage differentiation to attain maximum profits in equilibrium - exactly one
firm chooses mandatory advertising, while the other firm competes without
an ad-support or with optional advertising. With a strong ad-aversion in the
market, this differentiation-driven outcome is not ad-revenue sensitive, because
the high-price firm in this scenario does not profit from advertisements. It
is interesting to observe that not just competing without ad-support can be
profitable, also two ad-supported firms can co-exist in the market at positive
prices if implementing different advertising strategies.
In Chen’s duopoly bundling setting , mixed bundling is weakly dom-
inated by unbundling [11]. In contrast, here optional advertising (which has
similarity with mixed bundling as discussed earlier) is not a dominated strat-
egy. Uniform pricing in the context of advertising reduces the intensity of
competition between ad-supported firms; consequently, in competing with
mandatory-advertising firm, the firm with optional advertising is able to sus-
tain a higher price and obtain the same level of profits as if to compete without
advertising support. Note that this result is not driven by the revenue gener-
ated by advertising support; in fact, the optional-advertising firm derive zero
revenue from advertising in this case.
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1.5.2 Moderate to Mild Ad-Aversion
When the ad-averse consumer segment is of moderate size or smaller,
firms’ equilibrium strategies further depend on the marginal advertising rev-
enue. Without sufficient ad-aversion, firms have less leverage to create differ-
entiation, thus their competitive strategies may be completely driven by the
advertising profitability.
Lemma 1.5.2. Low Advertising Revenue





≤ α ≤ −1
2
(1 − β), the pure-strategy equilibria are (N,M) and
(O,O);
For an α∗ ∈ (−1
2
(1− β), (1− β)],
2) when −1
2
(1 − β) < α < α∗, the pure-strategy equilibria are (N,M) and
(N,O);
3) when α = α∗, the pure-strategy equilibria include all strategy sets except
(N,N);
4) when α > α∗, the pure-strategy equilibria are (M,O), (M,M) and (O,O).
Lemma 1.5.3. High Advertising Revenue
For β > 1
3







≤ α < α∗∗, the pure-strategy equilibria are (N,M) and (O,O);
2) when α = α∗∗, the pure-strategy equilibria are (N,M), (M,O), (M,M) and
(O,O).
2) when α > α∗∗, the pure-strategy equilibria are (M,O), (M,M) and (O,O).
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Lemma 5 states that when the marginal ad revenue is low, the firm
without ad-support is able to obtain a profitable market position in equilib-
rium as long as there exist a certain number of ad-averse consumers. With
a sufficiently high marginal ad revenue, the tipping point of α at which no
ad-support is not an equilibrium strategy is lower. In other words, when ad-
vertising generates enough returns, in equilibrium both firms adopt advertis-
ing support and, as a result engage in aggressive price competition, even with
moderate level of ad-aversion, whereas at low marginal ad revenue equilibrium
strategies are only advertising driven with a low ad-aversion in the market.
Proposition 1.5.4. When β < 1
3
and α > α∗, or β > 1
3
and α > α∗∗, no
advertising support is a dominated strategy; Mandatory advertising is a weakly
dominant strategy. The equilibrium strategies are advertising-driven.
Indicated in Proposition 5, when both firms choose ad-support in equi-
librium, no ad-support is a dominated strategy. This contrasts the general
results in the conventional bundling studies that unbundling (which is analo-
gous to no ad-support) is an equilibrium strategy [11]. The phenomenon shown
in our study is due to the impact of advertising revenue on firms’ competi-
tive behavior. As discussed under Lemma 3, advertising revenue can suppress
the equilibrium prices due to the ad-supported firm’s stimulated incentive to
gain a larger market share. As a result, in the presence of an ad-supported
opponent, the firm without an ad support may be easily cornered to charging
a low or zero price. This combined with the additional revenue associated
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with an advertising support makes it a dominated strategy to compete with-
out bundling advertisements. Also, mandatory advertising is weakly dominant
given the same condition, while with conventional bundling setup there exists
no dominant strategy.
Proposition 1.5.5. When −1
2
≤ α ≤ −1
2
(1 − β), optional advertising is a
weakly dominated strategy.
Regardless of the level of ad revenue, optional advertising is a weakly




(1−β) implying the favor-ad
consumer segment is slightly outweighs the ad-averse segment. At a glance,
it may seem counterintuitive because optional advertising provides full cus-
tomization that suits all consumers’ taste. While it clearly would be an optimal
strategy in a monopoly market, the forces of competition generate additional
tensions here when optional advertising is employed. The key insight is that
optional advertising creates little differentiation at certain levels of ad-aversion
resulting in intense rivalry and minimal profits for both firms. Thus, manda-
tory advertising weakly dominates optional advertising. Note that uniform
pricing has an opposite effect here compared to the strong ad-aversion case. Its
restriction on the firm with optional advertising now intensifies the price com-
petition between the ad-supported firms, because the mandatory-advertising
firm gains competitive strength from the increased number of consumers who
value ads. This connects with the bundling literature, in which mixed-bundling
is a dominated strategy [11].
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1.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some of the assumptions made throughout
our analysis.
Marginal Ad Revenue In the current model, ad-supported firms only derive
advertising revenue from consumers who value ads positively. An interesting
extension of our setup is to consider an additional positive advertising revenue
generated among the ad-averse consumers. This applies in situations such as
variation in ad-averse users’ interest towards ads (one may become usually ad-
loving while engaged in the search for a particular product or service), their
accidental clicks on pay-per-click ads, etc. Thus, we will also consider a smaller
marginal ad revenue relative to β that is proportional to the demand among
ad-averse consumers.
Le δ ∈ [0, 1] denote the proportion of ad-averse consumers contributing
to the ad revenue. The profit function of the ad-supported firm from Section
1.4.1 will then take the form π2(p2, p1) = (1−G(p2 − p1)) ∗ p2 + β ∗min{1−
G(p2 − p1), 1 + α} + β ∗ δ ∗ max{0,−G(p2 − p1) − α}, where βδ ≤ β can be
interpreted as the marginal ad revenue from ad-averse consumers, let us use
b = βδ. This will change the analysis except for the case in Section 1.4.1
with no-ad firm competing with the optional firm, where no revenue from the
ad-averse consumers who disable ads.
In other parts of the analysis, although most of the results now are
conditional on new inequalities with b, the main findings still hold with a
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few additional insights. We here omit the expressions of the new equilibrium
prices and profits as they differ slightly from the original results, and discuss
the intuitions underlying the results from the modified setup in the following
propositions.
Proposition 1.6.1. Under the strategy set (N,M), when b ≥ 1
2
, within the
range of −1 ≤ α < −2(1− b), p∗1 = −12α, p
∗
2 = 0.
The above proposition implies that a sufficiently profitable ad-averse
segment will lead the mandatory firm to price cut more aggressively while
competing with a firm without ad support. In the original model, the manda-
tory firm does not have the incentive to attract additional ad-averse consumers
since b = 0.
Proposition 1.6.2. If b ≥ 1
2
, the strategy set (M,M) is always one of the
pure-strategy equilibria.
Without b, for small values of α one firm would choose no ad-support
or optional ad-support; however, here a large b implies a profitable advertising
opportunity thus both firms compete with mandatory advertising. When α is
large, both firm choosing mandatory advertising is also an equilibrium under
the same intuition as the original model.
The results in this extension reflect the early years of online advertis-
ing, when pop-up and banner ads were ubiquitous and concepts of “respective
ads” were amorphous. Online services often undertook these advertising mech-
anisms and offered their products for free, which is consistent with Proposition
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7. The introduction of Google and Yahoo!’s pay-per-click advertising model
revolutionized online marketing. When ad revenue is only contingent on users’
clicks, revenues from ad-averse user became insignificant; given a large-averse
segment, in equilibrium the mandatory ad-support firm does not price at zero
and the competing firms do not all choose mandatory advertising. The incen-
tive resides in differentiating services; user experience is also improved. This
is shown by the original model.
Perfect substitutes To relax the assumption that two firms offer perfectly
substitutable services, firms’ services can be imperfect substitutes such that
consumers may prefer one over the other. In particular, the horizontal differ-
entiation is commonly specified using the Hotelling model. Firm 1 is located
at 0 and firm 2 at 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval
[0, 1]. A consumer at location x incurs transport cost δx to buy from firm
1 and δ(1 − x) to buy from firm 2. The parameter δ measures the degree
of service differentiation. The model becomes complicated since consumers
now have two dimensions of characteristics (x, θ), in which x and θ could be
independent or related.
The distributions of both θ and x are needed to determine the demand
for each firm. x and θ may be positive or negative correlated, but in either case
the firms’ demands are skewed without meaningful implications. If x and θ are
independently distributed, the results will merely have additional conditions
to the ranges of α to describe the equilibria when consumers’ preference for a
certain service exceeds some threshold. Overall, the introduction of horizontal
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differentiation may yield complex solutions that are difficult to interpret, with
the main effect of reducing the competition between firms such that Bertrand-
type competition under some conditions may no longer occur. We do not
believe the added dimension offers new insights for problem considered.
Consumer valuation for the service Another assumption is that con-
sumers have homogeneous valuation for the service offered by the firms with
reservation price r. We may relax this assumption by assuming that r follows
a distribution function F (r) on [r, r]. Although consumers have heterogeneous
reservation price r, for any particular consumer, two firms’ services are still
perfect substitutes. When comparing the a consumer’s utilities between these
services offered by the two firms, only the valuation for advertisements θ mat-
ters. Therefore, the relaxation of this assumption does not affect the results
as long as r satisfies some condition relating to α, such that the consumer
reservation value for the service does not depart too far below the necessary
value relating to α in our current analysis. The varying r values can impact
the monopoly case discussed in Section 1.4, where we focus on a relevant r
value such that the monopolist enjoys a higher profit than otherwise in a com-
petitive duopoly market. While the quantitative derivations may change with
a varying r, the analysis and results remain valid given that the distribution
of r satisfies a reasonable condition. Again, modeling r as a variable generates
no new idea to the problem on hand.
Without Assuming Positive Ad Valuation In the current model, we
have assumed a uniform distribution of ad valuation, which may extend into
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the positive range depending on the value of the lower bound. One may
argue that given the nature of advertisements, consumers may not have a high
positive valuation from ads. Here we show that our results are robust even
without consumers who have strictly positive valuation for ads.
We consider a variation of θ distribution that does not include any posi-
tive values; Instead, the positive values in the original distribution concentrate
on zero as a mass point. Thus, θ ∼ [α, 0], characterized by a cdf F (θ), such
that for θ < 0, F (θ) = G(θ), and for θ = 0, F (θ) = 1. The results for the
analysis where both firms are ad-supported are unaffected by this change of
distribution.








; thus the results are unchanged. For α > −1
2
, p∗1 = p
∗
2 = 0,
π∗1 = 0, and π
∗
2 = β(1 + α). The only difference from Lemma 3 is that firm
1 makes zero profit here due to the lack of advertising support. Intuitively,
in both scenarios, the users who do not dislike ads are indifferent between
the service offered by the competing firms. For the strategy set (N,O), the
competing firms have no leverage to create differentiation; thus, the subgame
equilibrium result is p∗1 = p
∗
2 = 0, π
∗
1 = 0, and π
∗
2 = β(1 + α), for all α.
Firms’ equilibrium strategies are then unchanged for the case of strong
ad-aversion. The results become much simpler in the case of moderate to
mild ad-aversion, where both firms choose ad-support in equilibrium: (M,M),
(M,O), (O,M), and (O,O). When positive ad valuation is removed, firms’ equi-
librium strategies are not sensitive to advertising profitability: The equilibrium
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strategies are either differentiation-driven with a strongly ad-averse market, or
advertising-driven with moderate to mild ad-aversion.
1.7 Conclusion
Competing firms’ strategies in business model innovation is studied in
the current paper, which focuses on a recent instance of innovative markets -
online service provision with revenue support from advertising. We consider
the variations of advertising mechanisms in terms of mandatory and optional
advertising strategies, analyze firms’ choices of competing without ad support,
or ad-supported business models of mandatory or optional advertising in the
market rivalry, and identify the driving forces for their equilibrium strategies.
Our findings articulate the relevance of market condition impacted by
IT in innovating firms’ decisions. Specifically, the customization allowed by
interactivity and greater information aggregation over the network push for-
ward an advertising age where ads are more informative and appealing, and
consumers’ attitudes towards ads are transforming. As firms strive to reap
profits through competing business model innovations, consumers’ valuation
for advertisements and, in some cases, the marginal advertising revenue are
both important factors in firms’ decision of acquiring advertising support and
type of advertising strategy to employ. Given a strongly ad-averse market, the
equilibrium strategies are differentiation driven, in that mandatory advertising
is always employed by exactly one firm while the other firm either competes
without an ad-support or employ optional advertising. However, when the ad
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taste becomes more positive overall, the equilibrium strategies are sensitive
to the profitability of advertisements. Given a sufficient level of advertising
returns, the equilibrium business models are advertising driven, which creates
a socially optimal outcome.
This work also offers theoretical contributions for the literature of bundling.
By considering a special bundled good, advertisements, we derive findings that
contrast with those of the conventional bundling framework. The revenue
generated by advertising is observed to intensify rivalry and lower equilib-
rium prices. Moreover, the distinction between mixed-bundling and optional
advertising in the pricing option creates an interesting effect that results in
mandatory advertising being a dominant strategy and optional advertising be-
ing dominated for certain ranges of ad valuation. The implication of this result
is that while the business model of service with optional advertising offers full
customization that suits the ad taste of all consumers, depending on firms’
strategic focus at the level of market ad-aversion, it may be an unprofitable
choice.
Thus far, we have been taking consumers’ taste for ads as given. In
future extension, it will be interesting to endogenize the ad taste such that
firms can choose the level of investment in advertising technology to influence
consumers’ response to ads. Also in the current work, the distribution of con-
sumers’ valuation for ads is common knowledge. This assumption is widely
used in the literature, and easily interpretable for the scenario where the dif-
ferentiation of consumer valuation for ads is application dependent. When
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firms attempt novel advertising models, they may conduct surveys and gather
data on consumer feedback that is unavailable to the public, in which case, a
model with asymmetric information may be more appropriate.
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Chapter 2
Reputation Stretching in Online Auctions
2.1 Introduction
Reputation unarguably plays a major role in environments that involve
interactions and exchange. As the Internet opens up a vast market for e-
businesses and trading individuals, the myriad of choices as well as the intrinsic
anonymity lead to an increased importance of reputation, which essentially
serves as an evaluation of one’s past performance in most online markets. The
studies in reputation have taken a broad range of perspectives as well as in
many different settings. We position our question in the performance-based
auction, where reputation is combined with the bids to determine the bidders’
ranking. In particular, we take the bidders’ perspective and investigate the
strategy of reputation stretching–the extension of one’s existing reputation in
one market to a new market–and how it affects bidders’ payoffs based on three
market factors: the market size, the expected performance, and the risk of the
new market.
In the conventional sense, reputation is reflected in a firm’s brand. Rep-
utation stretching in the branding context implies producing a new product
under an existing brand name. In the online markets, the infrastructure of
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the reputation systems allows users to have a similar option, that is using the
score representing the performance from the previous transactions in new and
disparate transactions. Evidentally, eBay permits reputation stretching by as-
signing only one reputation score to each user. For instance, a seller who sells
laptops as well as clothing under the same identity is implicitly using reputa-
tion stretching between two types of products. On the other hand, sellers can
potentially register separate accounts for selling different products or create
new accounts when the current reputation score becomes unsatisfactory; thus
the issue of multiple identities arises. Despite eBay’s effort to verify user iden-
tity in order to prevent the ownership of multiple accounts, it is not difficult for
users to cheat the system and start a new reputation from a clean slate. eBay’s
reputation system is representative of many other online marketplaces (e.g.,
Amazon.com), where reputation stretching is automatically applied while not
stretching (creating a new account) being a feasible alternative.
Another example of online reputation stretching resides in the rank-
ing system used by keyword advertising programs such as Google AdWords,
Yahoo! Sponsored Search, Microsoft AdCenter, etc. These keyword adver-
tising programs provide online marketing services, where advertisers specify
keywords to which they associate their advertisements and bid to display the
ads. While advertisers submit bids on how much they are willing to pay for
each click, the ranking of the ads are based on these bids combined with the
advertisers’ past performances. In particular, the past performance is mea-
sured by the historic click-through rate (CTR)–the ratio of the number of
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clicks an advertisement receives to the number of times it is displayed-which
is used as bidders’ reputation in terms of their click generating ability. Cur-
rently, the advertiser accounts do not include an option that allows them to
apply their reputation associated with a keyword market to another; in other
words, the advertisers’ reputation scores are automatically kept separate for
different keyword markets, and the not-stretching strategy is implicit.
The link between advertisers’ performances across keyword markets
can be discussed on several dimensions. Hence, the reputation stretching is-
sue in the performance-based auction context incorporates a moderate level of
complexity that invites research studies with various approaches for different
facades of the problem. One may point out that an advertiser’s click-through
performance is directly related to its brand name and consumers’ perception of
its product quality. Along the perspective of reputation relating to the brand
name, the problem seems quite similar to that of the goods market case. How-
ever, we should take into account that commonly-known websites are often
ranked well in the organic search results that the sponsored advertising actu-
ally provides opportunities for growing businesses to attract new customers,
in which case the advertisers’ performance may be largely impacted by the
effectiveness of the ad targeting strategy. Furthermore, on the topic of adver-
tisers’ ability in attracting clicks, the correlation between keyword markets is a
natural factor in reputation stretching. We believe examining the connections
between keyword markets and their relevance to advertisers’ bidding strategy
is a well-founded and a separate research issue from the scope of our study.
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We analyze the fundamental factors characterizing each market independently,
such as the market size, the expected performance, and the risk of the perfor-
mance in a market, and provide insights to the reputation stretching decision
aside from the interdependency elements between markets.
We use the auction framework to model the performance-based auc-
tion setting for both the short-term and long-term cases, and analyze our
results according to the three factors mentioned above. In both cases, an ad-
vertiser has an existing reputation from the base market, and is faced with
the reputation stretching decision before the auctions begin. The short-term
analysis considers a two-period model, with the new market auction followed
by the primary market auction. The short two-period setup provides a clean
abstraction of participation in the new market only temporarily. This is repre-
sentative of firms that are focused on their primary products and only extend
to a different market for special events. For example, online florists such as
ProFlowers advertise heavily in “flowers”-related keyword markets. They may
consider entering the market for the “gift baskets” keyword group for holidays
such as Valentine’s Day without continuing in that market when the hype is
over. A potentially more promotional event is the Olympics, during which
certain advertisers may choose to expand from their primary keyword mar-
kets for products highly attractive for their association with the occasion. It
is clear that further participation in the new markets after the events expire
provides no profitable opportunities, given that the firms have not chosen to
enter those markets in the past. Therefore, our short-term model emphasizes
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on the temporary participation with the primary market following the new
market auction to capture the effect of reputation stretching on the original
market. In the long-term case, participation in the new market persists. The
application is straightforward–firms expand their businesses to a new group
of keywords in addition to their current advertising campaigns. We take the
varied motivations behind such decision as given, and design the model in the
infinite horizon where the new market and the primary market take place back
to back. Alternatively, one could use a model where the two markets are ac-
tive simultaneously in each period. Due to the reciprocating effect, the results
will be equivalent to the simplified design chosen in our paper with only one
market per period and alternating markets in consecutive periods.
We obtained both mirroring and contrasting results in the short- and
long-term settings. We find that the advertiser with good reputation stretches
if the new market is significantly bigger than the primary market. Also, the
advertiser with good reputation is more likely to stretch if the performance of
the new market looks sufficiently promising, expecting a positive impact on
the primary market. In addition, the performance risk in the new market also
plays an important role. In a very competitive primary market, the advertiser
behaves like risk-seeker: the higher the risk, the more likely one will stretch.
We also investigate the long-term case, where the new market auction and the
primary market auction take place alternately in the infinite horizon. Some
results are notably different from those in the short-term analysis. When the
gap between performances in two markets is big, it is optimal for the advertiser
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not to stretch. The effect of risk in performance depends on the market sizes.
In general, the bidders tend to apply the risk effect to the bigger market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we briefly
review the related literature and compare our model with work that is related
to our study. Section 2.3 lays out our model, followed by an analysis of bid-
ding function and bidders’ expected payoffs in Section 2.4. We then examine
the short-term and long-term expanding cases in section 2.5 and section 2.6,
respectively. Finally, we conclude.
2.2 Literature Review
Early literature examined the role of reputation in the interaction be-
tween two parties. Having a “good” reputation can mean a seller providing
high-quality product at a certain price [26], a firm honoring a high wage after
paying the worker lower wage initially [44], a monopoly using predation for
new entrants [27], etc. In the moral hazard setting, one party relies on the
other party to take an action, while the other party can choose to perform dif-
ferently to its own short-term advantage; however the former party can then
terminate future interactions as a punishment to the other party [26] [44].
Establishing a reputation of performing expected action through repeated in-
teractions is crucial for continuing transactions. In the adverse selection set-
ting, at least one party has imperfect information, and the other party is of a
specific type, and shows its type through repeated interactions with the for-
mer party [27] [35] [43] [38]. Unlike the moral hazard setting, here the party
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with a type does not choose among different actions. Its performance is its
reputation, which signals the type. In both settings, reputation serves as a
powerful tool, using which a mechanism can induce optimal equilibria without
governmental and third party intervention.
While the economic role of reputation has been well examined, only
a few papers studied reputation stretching. Wernerfelt (1988), Pepall and
Richards (2002), and Cabral (2000) considered the reputation stretching (or
“umbrella branding” in Wernerfelt’s term) problem, where a firm’s reputation
on an old product can be used to sell a new product by that firm [47] [36] [9].
[47] and [9] considered reputation stretching in an adverse selection setting us-
ing the seller-buyer game model, where the seller makes the decision between
stretching and not stretching his/her reputation of the base product onto a
new product. They show that sellers of higher quality derive higher marginal
benefit from stretching (direct reputation effect), but sellers’ stretching behav-
ior also depends on the effect of the performance of the new product on the
reputation of the old product (reputation feedback effect). [47] and [9] differ
in the cost of starting from a new name; the former considers that creating a
new name is less costly than stretching from the existing reputation, while the
latter assumes that stretching is cost neutral. [36] studied a model in which
brand identity is a complementary feature that enhances consumer willingness
to pay. They focus on how a firm’s established strong brand name can affect
the competition in a new market.
While reputation has mostly been examined in the traditional economic
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setting of goods markets, recently studies explored reputation in electronic
commerce as well as online keyword advertising. In online transactions, where
users are anonymous and obtaining a new identity is trivial, reputation sys-
tems have been shown to reduce fraudulent behaviors for online buyer-seller
interactions [21] [33]. Reputation is also used in keyword auctions, which have
provided lucrative results for keyword advertising search engines [16] [30]. For
example, Liu and Chen (2006) has shown that compared to traditional auc-
tions, where bidders are weighed equally and are only ranked based on their
bids, weighted auctions yield higher performance [30]. In keyword auctions,
reputation serves as the weighing factor for the bidders; hence, bidders with
higher performances are given more weight and are preferred in the auction
ranking. The consequent payoff to the auctioneer is optimized with weighted
unit price auctions.
Our study connects the idea of reputation stretching with the weighted
auction setting, and research the effect of using a bidder’s reputation in one
auction for a different auction. Instead of using the seller-buyer game as in [9]
and many other related studies, we examine reputation stretching in a set-
ting similar to keyword auctions, where multiple bidders compete. While in
most other reputation studies, reputation induces a mechanism for establishing
trust between players, reputation in our study is a bidder’s attribute that de-
termines rankings of auctions. Different factors, such as market size, expected
performance and the risk of performance in the new market, are examined
and found to produce insightful results. Moreover, we study both a short-
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term model and a long-term model to gain an in-depth understanding of the
effects of reputation on bidders’ total payoffs.
2.3 The Model
We consider a two-market multi-period model where one advertiser,
specifically indicated by i, faces the decision of whether to stretch its reputation
from one market to the other.
Advertisers are heterogeneous in two dimensions (v, q): valuation-per-
click or unit-valuation, v, and its reputation characterized by the click-through
rate (CTR), q. Valuation per click can be understood as the average revenue
the advertiser derives from each click received on its advertisement. The CTR
is essentially the probability the advertisement is clicked during each display.
It characterizes the degree to which the advertisement attracts users and is
modeled as the indicator of the advertiser’s performance in a market. Let
s ≡ vq, which measures the advertiser’s total valuation for a given traffic size.
Thus, q in the current market impacts the advertiser’s payoff and serves as its
reputation for the next period. We apply one of the common assumptions in
auction theories, Independent Private Value (IPV) assumption, that one’s total
valuation is her private information, and is independent of others’ valuations.
In the first market (or primary market) where advertiser i has an ex-
isting reputation, the size of traffic or the market size is k1, normalized into 1
(k1 = 1). n1 advertisers (including advertiser i) compete in the first market,
and their total valuations satisfy distribution G1(s), which can be derived from
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the joint distribution of (v, q). We assume advertiser i has a fixed unit valua-
tion vi, and reputation q1 that does not vary from period to period. In other
words, q1 represents the advertiser i’s fixed reputation which has stabilized in
the primary market.
In the second market (or new market) where advertiser i has no prior
reputation, the size of traffic is k2. In the new market, n2 advertisers compete,
and their total valuations satisfy distribution G2(s). We assume the advertiser
has the same unit valuation vi as in the primary market, which simply is, and
can be shown rigorously as, a normalization, because we allow different market
sizes and valuation distributions in two markets. In other words, a model using
a different vi for the new market is equivalent to incorporating the difference
into k and G(s), leaving v the same as that in the primary market. The
advertiser may have a high or low performances in this market. The expected
performance in each period is q2, having outcomes q2 + ε and q2− ε with equal
probability. ε indicates the risk of the performance in the new market, and
is relatively small such that q2 − ε is bounded away from 0. New entrants
to this market are assigned reputation q0, since they have no past reputation
records. Thus, advertiser i will be assigned q0 if it chooses not to stretch its
reputation from the primary market. In the case of stretching, the advertiser
uses the performance in the primary market q1 as the initial reputation in the
new market.
The primary market is constructed to characterize a setting where the
advertiser has established its marketing ability and possesses an existing rep-
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utation. Most of the uncertainties reside in the new market, where the ad-
vertiser has no prior participation, thus decides whether to stretch its existing
reputation from the primary market according to several factors that will be
analyzed later in this section.
We use the auction setup to model the competitive environment, mo-
tivated by Google keyword auctions. We assume that the auctioneer allocates
traffic through a unit-price auction. Every advertiser places its bid on the
amount it is willing to pay for each click, and the ranking is based on advertis-
ers’ scores. The score is the product of the advertiser’s bid and its reputation,
which can be either performance in the previous period in the case of stretch-
ing, or the default initial reputation q0 otherwise. The bidder with the highest
score wins the auction, but only pays the unit price high enough to yield
the second highest score when calculated with the winner’s reputation. This
second-price-like auction model, through its allocation rule, captures the es-
sential mechanisms and impact of keyword auction practice by Google and
Yahoo!.
Advertisers are risk neutral, and their objective in each auction is to
maximize their expected payoffs. We denote b as the advertiser’s unit-price
bid in a market, and q̂ as its reputation, which can take the value of either
its last-period performance or q0. b and q̂ determine its winning probability
in this market, Pr(b, q̂). Also denote p as the actual unit-price the advertiser
pays if it wins. So, conditional on winning, its unit surplus is v− p. Then the
expected payoff can be written as
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u(v, b, q̂) = k ∗ E(q) ∗ (v − p) ∗ Pr(b, q̂) (2.1)
where k ∈ {k1, k2} is the size of traffic or the market size, and E(q) is the
expected click-through rate or the expected performance in this market.
The sequence of actions is as follows: Advertiser i first decides whether
to stretch in the new market, and then competes in the new market with the
reputation based on its stretching decision. Next, it competes in the primary
market using that reputation. The realization of q in any period determines the
advertiser’s payoff in that period; and, if stretching is been chosen, q becomes
q̂ for the next period, affecting the advertiser’s winning probability in that
period. For the above sequence of actions, we discuss both the short-term
and long-term expanding cases. In the short-term expanding (two-period)
model, the advertiser only competes in the new market for one period, which is
modeled as a one-shot game. In the long-term expanding (infinitely repeated)
model, the advertiser competes in both markets alternately and infinitely.
We focus on the impact of three factors on the stretching decision:
the market size, the advertiser’s expected performance, and the risk of the
performance in the new market.
2.3.1 Bidding Strategies
To begin the analysis, we derive advertisers’ equilibrium bidding strate-
gies and their equilibrium payoff in any single auction.
43
Lemma 2.3.1. In each auction, bidding the true unit valuation is the (weakly)
dominant strategy.
Upon this truth bidding equilibrium, we obtain the equilibrium winning
probability of an advertiser with unit valuation v and reputation q̂ in each
auction: Pr(v, q̂) = [G(q̂v)]n−1. For notational simplicity, we denote Hl(s) ≡
[Gl(s)]
nl−1, l ∈ {1, 2}, which is the cumulative distribution function of the
highest total valuation of nl − 1 bidders in market l. Hl(s) roughly embodies
the competition in a market. Notice that Hl(s) ∈ [0, 1], and increases in s.
The price an advertiser pays, conditional on its winning, is the expected














where s1:n−1 is the random variable of the highest total valuation among
n− 1 draws from the distribution G(s).
Substituting the above equilibrium winning probability and price in the
payoff function (2.1), we can write the equilibrium payoff as










where the second step is a result of integration by substitution.
2.4 Short-Term: Two-Period Setup
In this section, we focus on the case where the advertiser runs short-
term business in the new market. Examples of the short-term expanding
include advertising for special events (e.g., FIFA World Cup and Olympics),
seasonal promotions (e.g., Christmas, Valentine’s Day, etc.), where the ad-
vertiser does not stay in the new market after the temporary activity. This
contrasts with the long-term case discussed in the following section, where
the second market is a new business that the advertiser is starting and will
continually manage.
We model bidding in this short-term new market as a one-shot game.
In the first period, the advertiser competes in the auction for the new market
either under a separate name (non-stretching, with the assigned reputation
q0) or under the same name as that in the primary market (stretching, with
reputation q1). In the second period, the advertiser competes in the auction
for the primary market again, using reputation q1 if non-stretching is chosen
or the realized performance in the new market as reputation if the strategy of
stretching is chosen.
If advertiser i chooses not to stretch, then it is assigned q0 as the initial
reputation for the new market. Therefore, its expected payoff in the new
market is U2(vi, q0) = k2q2
∫ vi
0
H2(q0t)dt by (2.2), and, in the primary market,
U1(vi, q1) = q1
∫ vi
0
H1(q1t)dt (recall that k1 = 1). The total expected payoff in
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two markets is U1(vi, q1) + U2(vi, q0).
If advertiser i chooses to stretch, it brings the reputation from the
primary market q1 into the new market, and its expected payoff in the new




performance in the new market is q2 + ε or q2 − ε with probability 0.5 each,
which not only affects its realized payoff for the current new market but also
serves as the reputation for the primary market in the next period. We will
refer to the latter as the feedback effect. Clearly, due to the feedback effect,
different realized performance/reputations result in different payoffs in the
primary market: U1(vi, q2 + ε) or U1(vi, q2 − ε). Notice that at the time the
advertiser makes the stretching decision, it only has an expectation about the
future payoff that depends on the uncertain performance, but does not know














The total expected payoff in both markets for the stretching case is
E[U1(vi, q)] + U2(vi, q1).
The equilibrium stretching behavior can be determined by comparing
the payoffs under stretching and non-stretching cases. The difference in payoffs
is
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[H1((q2 + ε)t) +H1((q2 − ε)t)− 2H1(q1t)] dt (2.3)
Thus, if ∆ > 0, it is optimal for an advertiser to stretch; otherwise,
it is optimal not to stretch. Clearly, the relative market size will impact the
stretching decision. We conclude the following:
Proposition 2.4.1. Given q0, q2, and ε, when the new market is large enough
(k2 ≥ k∗), if q1 > q0, it is optimal for the advertiser to stretch; if q1 < q0, it is
optimal not to stretch.
When the new market is of considerable size relative to the primary
market, the payoff in the new market dominates that in the primary market.
Thus, for a high-reputation advertiser, the gain from stretching in the new
market by getting competitive advantage can out-weigh any possible loss from
the negative feedback effect on the primary market; for a low-reputation ad-
vertiser, the loss from stretching is too big to be compensated by the possible
gain from primary market.
It is worth noting that when the new market is small, it is not clear
whether advertisers with high reputation will stretch. In fact, in the case
with small enough new market, the advertiser’s stretching decision depends
on the feedback effect on the primary market: if q2  q1, the advertiser will
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stretch expecting that the high reputation in the new market will enhance
the competitiveness in the primary market; if q2  q1, the advertiser will not
stretch expecting that the low reputation in the new market will dampen the
competitiveness in the primary market.
Proposition 2.4.2. Given q0, ε, and k2, for a high reputation advertiser (q1 >
q0 ), there exists q
∗
2 such that for any q2 ≥ q∗2 it is optimal for the advertiser to
stretch; and the gain from stretching is increasing in q2. For a low reputation
advertiser (q1 < q0 ), increase in q2 has no conclusive effect.
When the advertiser’s reputation is higher than the default reputa-
tion, stretching is clearly advantageous for winning in the new market. Also,
when the expected performance is high enough, the new market is optimistic.
Therefore by stretching, the high-reputation advertiser can potentially further
improve the reputation significantly, which in turn benefits its primary market
payoff.
However, for an advertiser, whose reputation is lower than the default
reputation, its stretching decision depends on the tradeoff between the loss of
expected payoff in the new market and possible gain from the reputation feed-
back effect in the primary market. When the expected performance increases,
both the loss and gain increase, so the net effect is inconclusive. It is possible
that under some circumstances, a low reputation advertiser also has incentive
to stretch (when the feedback effect dominates the direct effect).
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Lastly, we find that the risk of the performance in the new market also
impacts the stretching decision.
Proposition 2.4.3. If H1(s) is convex, the gain from stretching is increasing
in the risk in the new market. If H1(s) is concave, the opposite holds.
Recall that H1(s) = G1(s)
n1−1 is the distribution of the highest total
valuation of one’s competitors, and G1(s) is the distribution of total valuation
in the primary market. Convexity of G1(s)
n1−1 means that the competitors’
highest valuation is more likely to appear toward high valuation end, which
can be easily satisfied. It can be shown that non-decreasing density function
G′1(s) suffices to guarantee G1(s)
n1−1 to be convex. Also, for most continuous
distributions, when n1 is reasonably big, G1(s)
n1−1 commonly emerges as con-
vex. Both cases can be interpreted as that the market is competitive enough:
the former emphasizes the bidders’ values are skewed toward the high-end;
and the latter simply means enough bidders compete in the market.
As indicated above, when the primary market is competitive, an in-
crease in the risk of the new market performance may benefit the advertiser
in the case of stretching. Here increasing the risk has two effects: making
the good realization better and making the bad realization worse. Given that
the competitor is more skewed toward high valuation, the impact from being
better is more significant than that from being worse.
By the results derived in this section, when an advertiser is consid-
ering stretching its reputation to a market short term - for example, selling
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Olympic coin sets - it can base the decision on its current reputation and the
three factors discussed above. First, if the new market is large (e.g., there is
an enormous demand for Olympic coins sets since it is a global event), then
high-reputation advertiser should stretch to take advantage of the established
reputation. Second, if the expected performance in the new market is high,
stretching is optimal for high-reputation. Third, in the stretching case, the
risk of the performance in the new market may have different implications for
the advertiser depending on the competition intensity of the primary market.
Facing a fierce competition in the primary market, the advertiser may appre-
ciate the risk of the new market, expecting that possible high performance
could bring in a significant revenue increase via the feedback effect.
2.5 Long-Term: Infinite-Horizon Setup
In this section, the new market is not short-lived like in the previous
section; rather, it repeats and alternates with the primary market infinitely.
This model describes the setting where the advertiser creates new advertis-
ing campaigns in the business area dissimilar to its current one, and bids for
both campaigns in the alternating manner. Long-term new markets in general
application include firms introducing new products, in which case reputation
stretching is using the same brand name as before. For example, Sony manu-
factures various home-entertainment products, such as TVs and DVD players,
while producing laptop computers under the same name. As in the long-term
expanding case, it continues to participate in both home-entertainment and
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computing markets; thus, its reputation in the two markets may affect each
other. This section studies the advertiser’s decision of whether to stretch its
reputation on an primary market to the long-term new market, when the effect
in the case of stretching will bounce between the two markets throughout the
infinite horizon.
We model the long-term expanding case in the way that the new and
the primary markets take place one after another from period to period. We
assume future revenue discounting is reasonably small so that the impact of
the initial reputation in the new market on the overall revenue can be ignored.
For instance, in the case of non-stretching the starting reputation for the new
market is q0, but its effect on the overall revenue is gradually replaced by that
of the advertiser’s actual performance in the new market overtime. Moreover,
we continue with the setup that the performance in the new markets can be
q2 + ε or q2 − ε with equal probability.
We check the payoffs in two consecutive periods, the primary market
period and the new market period. In the case of stretching, the payoff in the
new market is k2q2
∫ vi
0
H2(q1t)dt, since here expected performance is q2, and
the reputation is q1, the performance in the primary market, i.e., E(q) = q2
and q̂ = q1 in (2.2). Similarly, we can formulate the payoff in the primary
market noting the performance is and the reputation can be q2 + ε or q2 − ε
















































[2H2(q1t)−H2((q2 + ε)t)−H2((q2 − ε)t)] dt




[2H2(q1t)−H2((q2 + ε)t)−H2((q2 − ε)t)] dt ≡ D2(q1, q2),
the difference in the unit surplus between stretching and non-stretching in the
new market. Similar to the short-term expanding case, the relative market
size impacts the stretching decision, but in a different way.
Proposition 2.5.1. Given q2 and ε, for an advertiser with q1 and a big enough
market (k2 ≥ k∗), if D2(q1, q2) > 0, it is optimal for the advertiser to stretch;
if D2(q1, q2) < 0, it is optimal not to stretch.
Given the competition structure and the expected performance in the
new market, D2(q1, q2) > 0 requires that q1 is sufficiently large, or the adver-
tiser has a good reputation in the primary market.
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Here the similar intuition as in Proposition (1) holds: When the new
market is large enough, a high-reputation advertiser stretches, and a low-
reputation advertiser does not. However, the differences from the short-term
case are significant. First, notice that the assigned reputation q0 does not play
a role in the stretching decision, this is due to our assumption that the dis-
counting of future revenue flow is reasonable small. In addition, the stretching
decision closely relates to the performance (q2 and ε) as well as the competi-
tion (H2(s)) in the new market when the new market is large. In contrast, in
the short-term case, the stretching decision critically depends on the difference
between q1 and q0.
Next we discuss the impact of the performance in the new market (q2
,ε) on the stretching decision. We focus on the case with the same competition
in both markets (H1(s) = H2(s)).
Proposition 2.5.2. Given ε, k2 and H1(s) = H2(s), for an advertiser with




2 such that under any q2 < q
L
2 or q2 > q
H
2 it is optimal
for the advertiser not to stretch. For q2 ∈ [qL2 , qH2 ], the optimal decision on
stretching depends on further conditions.
This proposition states that the gap between the expected performances
in two markets determines the advertiser’s stretching decision. When the dif-
ference between the two markets is large, the advertiser gets a high total payoff
keeping the reputations separate, benefiting from the market with the high ex-
pected performance. If the advertiser chooses to stretch, the reputations of the
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two markets merge. The high-reputation will be applied in the low-performing
market, which yields a low reputation that will reduce the expected payoff in
the high-performing market. As a result, it is optimal not to stretch when the
difference between the expected performances from the two markets is large.
As a result, when q2 is sufficiently high, it is optimal not to stretch. When q1
is sufficiently high, the same reasoning applies in the reverse (stretching from
new market to the primary market), due to the symmetry in the long-term
expanding case.
Notice that this result is considerably different from that in the short-
term case, where stretching is optimal for high-reputation advertisers as long
as the new market is optimistic enough. Such difference is mainly driven by
the asymmetry in the way reputations in two markets impact payoffs. In
particular, in the short-term case, the advertiser does not have a chance to
build up its reputation in the new market: q2 does not impact the reputation
in the new market. In contrast, in the long-term case, q2 can be shifted by
the performance in the primary market to affect the reputation in the primary
market in the case of stretching, or affect the new market in the case of not
stretching.
Proposition 2.5.3. In the case with the same competition in both markets
(H1(s) = H2(s)) and convex H1(s), if q1 > k2q2, the gain from stretching is
increasing in the risk of the performance of the new market; if q1 < k2q2, the
opposite holds.
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The positive effect from risk is different in the long-term expanding
case. Here the risk can impact either the primary market or the new market.
If the advertiser stretches, the positive effect hits the primary market; in the
non-stretching case, the positive effect hits the new market. Therefore, when
the primary market is larger, it is optimal for the advertiser to utilize the effect
on the primary market, and stretch; otherwise, not stretching is the optimal
choice.
According to the findings in this section, advertisers considering bid-
ding with a second advertising campaign long-term should implement their
stretching strategies differently than in the short-term expanding case. The
assigned default reputation value here is negligible. Only the size, the per-
formance, and the competitiveness of the new market impact the stretching
decision. Moreover, the primary market and the new market will operate in
a symmetric fashion; thus the difference between the performances in the two
markets matters.
2.6 Conclusion
Motivated by keyword auctions, we analyzed advertisers’ reputation
stretching decisions in short-term and long-term models. We found that the
stretching decision is critically dependent on the market size, the expected
performance of the new market, and the risk of performance in the new mar-
ket. Moreover, some results of the conditions for stretching are significantly
different in the short-term and the long-term settings.
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In the two-period short-term model, if stretching means using a bet-
ter reputation, the advertiser is willing to stretch as long as the new market
is sufficiently big. And intuitively, a promising new market induces a high-
reputation advertiser to stretch. In the long-term case, although a large new
market size also leads to stretching, the difference between the performances
of the two markets determines the advertiser’s stretching behavior, since the
effect of stretching is symmetric for the two markets in the infinite horizon. We
also found that in both short- and long-term cases, higher risk yields a higher
payoff in a competitive market for the following period, thus is desirable for
the advertisers. In the short-term case, a higher risk provides the advertiser
with more incentive to stretch; but in the long-term case, the advertiser bases
its decision on the comparison of the effects of the risk on the two markets,
because depending on its stretching decision, the positive risk effect can carry
onto either market.
The results derived from our model provide insights for the reputation
stretching issue. Our analysis on the risk effect and other factors in both the
short-term and long-term cases provided in-depth understanding to reputation
stretching decision in the competitive environment. By finding conditions for
the optimal stretching decision, our study has taken a preliminary step to
designing an optimal reputation system in auction settings. Some work that
follows may include auctioneer’s strategies in designing auction mechanism
given the equilibrium behaviors of the bidders, and further developments of
the model to consider different reputation measures.
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Chapter 3
Regulatory Policies for Demand-Driven
Innovation by Heterogeneous Firms
3.1 Introduction
An economic recession often heightens the awareness for innovation. In
responding to the current economic meltdown, the Obama administration has
allocated large sums of funding for the development of science and engineering
to stimulate innovation efforts [20]. $22.5 billion dollars are distributed among
the major research agencies including the National Science Foundation (NSF),
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Energy (DOE),
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), etc. [34]. In the
meantime, the Obama administration is attempting to make the R&D tax
credit permanent to increase the incentive for innovation by businesses [45].
In order to evaluate the impact of these research stimuli, it is crit-
ical to understand the implications of different innovation policies. In this
paper, using a dynamic game framework we analyze innovators’ equilibrium
decisions and R&D efforts facing economic shocks, and explore the impact of
public policies on R&D through reducing innovators’ sunk costs and variable
costs. Our findings provide theoretical explanations for firms’ R&D activities
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through business cycles, and strong theoretical support for empirical evidence
on innovation policies in the forms of government subsidies and tax incentives.
On innovation activities within fluctuating business cycles, one argu-
ment states that under unfavorable economic climates firms cut back on R&D
in order to focus on their core business and that motivating continued innova-
tion efforts is crucial for reviving the economy [37]; However, others argue that
it is exactly the recession that provides the strongest driving force for firms
to explore drastically new ideas for a chance to survive and thrive. In the
research front, empirical studies has shown strong support for the procyclical-
ity of R&D activities [4], while other recent work demonstrates that recession
should foster innovation [2] [8].
Barlevy examined the inefficient procyclical allocation of innovation
within business cycles, and analyzed the problem based on the externality of
R&D that benefits firms aside from the innovator [4]; Taking a different an-
gle, we look at the heterogeneity in innovators’ variable costs. As Schumpeter
stated, “[profit] is the premium which capitalism attaches to innovation” [39],
entrepreneurs enters the R&D race based on their evaluation of future market
profitability with the potential costs, which are conditional on their capital,
resources, and capability. We model the impact of business cycles as exoge-
nous income shocks that shift the market demand; In a recession, consumers
have lower disposal income and have less desire to purchase the higher quality
products. Our results show that more efficient (low variable R&D cost) firms
innovate more in a recession due to dampened competition as less efficient
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(high variable R&D cost) firms perceive lower future profits and exit the inno-
vation race. When less efficient firms innovate in the boom, the efficient firms
innovate at a lower intensity in equilibrium, because intensified competition
reduces innovation. However, in the latter case the aggregate innovation rate
is higher since both types of firms are innovating, which is consistent with the
empirical evidence in the literature and reconciles the conflicting view points
on innovation activities in a downturn.
Based on the analytical results, we demonstrated several numerical ex-
amples and derived insights for innovation policies. By varying the R&D fixed
cost, we found that subsidies that directly lower this cost may not stimulate in-
novation, because it reduces innovating firms’ incentive to offset the sunk cost
while maximizing profits; in other words, firms become “lazier.” However, at a
very large fixed cost, the industry only has efficient firms innovating, where the
aggregate innovation rate is lower than in an industry where all firms choose
to innovate. The empirical literature on subsidy policies also shows this in-
consistency [18]. On the other hand, we found that reducing variable R&D
cost has a generally favorable effect and encourages both types of firms to
innovate at a higher rate. Various R&D tax incentives, such as tax credits, are
examples of policies that directly affect the R&D variable cost. Our finding is
supported by wide empirical evidence on positive impact of tax incentives on
firms’ innovation efforts [14] [23] [6].
This work also offers theoretical contributions to the related literature.
Foellmi and Zweimuller studied the effect of income inequality on growth using
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non-homothetic consumer preference [17]. They found that higher income
inequality induces innovation - the effect of higher price that results from
higher income inequality dominates the effect of larger market size, which
occurs under lower income inequality [17]. In their formulation, both the poor
and rich consumer segments either all purchase one good or not. Our model
incorporates the consumer tastes as well as income levels, under which market
segmentation occurs for each income level. This allows for the analysis of
richer results, as market segmentation varies with consumer preferences.
We also account for the heterogeneity of competing innovators at dif-
ferent costs; As a result, we are able to contrast different types of firms as in-
novation rate either changes smoothly or jumps with income, and infer policy
implications. Furthermore, the explicit characterization of vertically differen-
tiation shows that the equilibrium can fall under several cases; we found that
within the case where high-income consumers only purchase from high-quality
firm (low-quality firm only gets low-income consumers), the innovation rate is
sensitive to inequality and per-capita income, whereas in the case where both
types of consumers purchase from both firms in equilibrium, innovation rate is
insensitive to changes in inequality when the per-capita income is held fixed.
These imply that the segmentation of consumers at various income levels leads
to different results when examining how income parameters affect innovation
rate, and are in sharp contrast with the findings in [17].
Studies in the industrial organization literature have examined firm-
level R&D issues. However, this line of work has mostly focused on a static
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model that limits the analysis to a single or finite period model [29] [32], with a
few exceptions such as Segal and Whinston’s work on anti-trust policy and in-
novation [40]. We adopt their framework with an extension to include dynamic
draws of innovators’ types in terms of their variable costs. Moreover, we endo-
genize entrant’s and incumbents’ profits using a consumer income distribution
and product quality levels to include the demand factor, which is absent from
Segal and Whinston’s work. Furthermore, deviating from a monopolistic mar-
ket, we consider a vertically differentiated market with multiple incumbents
where successful innovations trigger simultaneous entry and exit. The shifting
of business cycles that is reflected in consumer income change then plays a ma-
jor role in incentizing potential entrants’ R&D efforts, as consumers’ demands
directly determines the future rewards of the innovators.
Based on Shaked and Sutton, the seminal work on market equilibrium
with vertical differentiation [41], we relax the assumption of uniform income
distribution by generalizing the distribution, and further refine their model
with a taste shock for consumers at all income levels. This setup lifts the dis-
tribution restriction imposed in most analytical work, in turn permits matching
of actual data moments to find results relevant to realistic economic settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the price
competition game and analyze the endogenous market structure in Section 3.2.
Then we present the innovation race and analyze the firm’s innovation decisions
in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the reaction of equilibrium innovation rate
to different income shocks and regulatory policies. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Price Competition and Market Structure
The present paper develops a dynamic model with price competition
on differentiated products in each period. This model connects consumers’
demand and firms’ innovation effort through endogenous market structure.
The analysis shows the impact of the aggregate economic conditions from the
demand side on aggregate innovation. In this section, we describe the model
setup for the static price competition, and analyze firm’s pricing strategies and
market segmentation based on consumers’ preferences. In Section 3.3, we will
analyze the firm’s innovation behaviors.
Our framework has an infinite horizon, where each discrete period has
the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). In each period, there exists two groups of
firms differing in their objectives and actions. The incumbent firms compete
in price in the product market, into which the innovations are introduced as
the latest generation, or highest quality, good; The potential entrants are the
firms making innovation decisions in the R&D race. This section formulates
the competition and market structure in the product market among the in-
cumbents. The innovators, prior to successfully innovating and entering the
product market, choose whether to enter the R&D race and, if so, the equilib-
rium level of innovation effort. That is presented in Section 3.3.
Using the dynamic programming approach, we solve for the stationary
Markov perfect equilibria of the infinite-horizon game. This section analyzes
the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium of the pricing competition
game in a static vertical differentiation model. Assuming firms do not collude,
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the pricing strategies in the analysis here is part of the stationary Markov
perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game.
3.2.1 Consumers
The setup here extends Shaked and Sutton [41] by generalizing the
consumer income distribution. A continuum of consumers are heterogeneous
in their income levels and tastes for the product. Denote a consumer’s income
by I ∈ {IH , IL} , such that IL < IH , and 4 = IH − IL,; let πL ∈ [0, 1] and
πH ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of low and high income segments respectively.
πH + πL = 1. Define income per capita I = IHπH + IlπL, the relative high
income ratio qh =
IH
I
. Thus the triple (I, qh, πH) characterizes the income
distribution of the economy. Furthermore, each consumer experiences a taste
shock denoted by the random variable z that follows the uniform distribution:
z ∼ U [z, z]. For simplicity, a consumer’s taste is fixed across her life.
In each period, consumers observe firms which produce vertically dif-
ferentiated, substitute goods as a result of the innovation race, described in
section 3.3. Denote k = 1, ..., n as an index of the quality of products, where
a higher k represents a higher quality.
The consumers are utility maximizing:
max U(I, z, k) = uk ∗ (I + z)
where uk = e
ak following [12] and u0 < u1 < ... < un. Each consumer’s
utility is defined by the utility for consuming a certain quality good weighted
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by the consumer’s disposable income and taste. Let Ck be the relative utility









Define zjk as the indifference taste level in the income segment j, so that
the consumer with taste zjk is indifferent between product k and k− 1 at their
respective prices. So for j ∈ {L,H},
U(Ij − pk, zjk, k) = U(Ij − pk−1, z
j
k, k − 1)
From here, we derive
zj1 = p1C1 − Ij (3.1)
zjk = pk−1(1− Ck) + pkCk − Ij (3.2)
Then consumers within each income segment with taste z > zjk has the pref-
erence order (k, pk)  (k − 1, pk−1).
Proposition 3.2.1. The indifference taste levels zjk have the following prop-
erties:
1. ∀ k, zjk > z
j
k−1, for j ∈ {L,H};
2. ∀ k, zHk < zLk ;
3. ∀ k, zHk + IH = zLk + IL, so zHk +4 = zLk .
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3.2.2 Market Structure Analysis
Firms’ revenue functions take different forms depending on market seg-
mentation, which is determined by the values of the exogenous parameters
(e.g., those for income distribution and taste) and by the equilibrium prices.
For example, a firm’s revenue function will not include the term describing
the low-income segment, if in equilibrium its price does not capture any low-
income consumers; and the levels of high and low incomes as well as upper and
lower bounds for consumers’ taste impact such segmentation in equilibrium.
The revenue functions for n firms below are listed by these cases1.
For k = 1, R1(p1, p2, ..., pn), the revenue of firm 1 given the price of his
product p1, is expressed in terms of the following cases:






k , the first and the last inequalities
are directly obtained from Proposition 3.2.1. We assume zLk−1 < z
H
k , which implies that for
some taste levels both low- and high-income consumers will purchase the low-quality good;
whereas the reverse would mean that those with high-income and purchase the low-quality
good would prefer not purchasing anything if endowed with low-income. We have made
this assumption instead of considering the other case zHk < z
L
k−1 due to the reasons that 1)
zLk−1 < z
H
k represents a more realistic phenomenon, where low- and high-income consumers’
preferences have some overlap; 2) Through simulation we found the current ordering to hold
in equilibrium under the range of parameter values that are justified in the related literature
(see Section 3.4). The results based on the reverse inequality zHk < z
L
k−1 have also been
derived and tested numerically. However, the analysis is omitted here, since this case is not
possible in equilibrium under the relevant parameter values.
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2 − z)πL, zH2 ≤ z and zL2 ≥ z;
p1(z
H
2 − z)πH + p1(zL2 − z)πL, zL1 ≤ z and zH2 ≥ z;
p1(z
H
2 − z)πH + p1(zL2 − zL1 )πL, zH1 ≤ z and zL1 ≥ z;
p1(z
H
2 − zH1 )πH + p1(zL2 − zL1 )πL, zH1 ≥ z.
(3.3)
In the first two cases, the lowest taste consumers among the low-income
segment strictly prefer purchasing the low-quality product than not buying –
the low-income market is covered; In case 1, all high-income consumers will
purchase the high-quality product, whereas in case 2, they are split between
two products. In the last two cases, some low-taste consumers in the low-
income segment would not purchase even the low-quality product - the low-
income market is not covered; In case 3, the high-income segment is covered,
whereas in case 4, the high-income market may not be covered.
For 1 < k < n, Rk(p1, p2, ..., pn), the revenue of firm k given the price
of his product pk, is,
Rk(p1, p2, ..., pn) =
pk(z
H
k+1 − z)πH + pk(zLk+1 − zLk )πL, zHk ≤ z
pk(z
H
k+1 − zHk )πH + pk(zLk+1 − zLk )πL, zHk ≥ z;
(3.4)
And for k = n,
Rn(p1, p2, ..., pn) = pn(z − zHn )πH + pn(z − zLn )πL. (3.5)
The first-order conditions are,
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• for 1 < k < n,z
L
k+1 − πLzLk − πHz − πH∆− pk[(Ck+1 − 1) + πLCk] = 0, zHk ≤ z
zLk+1 − zLk − pk[(Ck+1 − 1) + Ck] = 0, zHk ≥ z,
(3.6)
• for k = n,
(z − zHn )πH + (z − zLn )πL − pnCn = 0. (3.7)
Lemma 3.2.2. Let z < min{2Nz+(2N−1)IL−πH∆, (2N−1πL+2)z+(2N−1πL+
2N−1 − 1)IL + πH∆}, for any Nash equilibrium in this vertically differentiated
market, at most N firms (producing products of qualities n, n−1, .. n−(N−1))
obtain positive market shares.
We have derived the necessary condition for an N-firm equilibrium
in Lemma 3.2.2. To further analyze the existence of such equilibrium, for
tractability we apply the lemma to the N=2 case and consider a two-firm
market.
Proposition 3.2.3. Let z < min{4z+ 3IL−πH∆, (2πL + 2)z+ (2πL + 1)IL +
πH∆}, for any Nash equilibrium in this vertically differentiated market, at














zj2 + Ij + (z
j
1 + Ij)(V − 1)
C2
(3.9)
Referring back to Equations (3.3), we get the following FOCs for firm 1, listed
in the order of the corresponding cases:
zL2 =

z + (zL1 + IL)(V − 1)
πH∆ + z + (z
L
1 + IL)(V − 1)
πH(∆ + z) + z
L
1 πL + (z
L
1 + IL)(V − 1 + πL)
zL1 + (z
L
1 + IL)V ;
(3.10)











z + πH∆− IL − (zj1 + Ij)(V − 1)
] (3.11)
Figure 1 plots firm 1’s FOCs for different ranges of zL1 . Regions 1
through 4 in the figure correspond to the four cases of Equation (3.3); and
Regions 5, 6 and 7 are the regions between the adjacent cases. In these regions,
in equilibrium one firm varies its price while the other holds its price constant.
Note that from Equations (3.10), firm 1’s FOCs are expressed as functions
zL2 (z
L
1 ), which is increasing, whereas from Equations (3.11) firm 2’s FOCs are
decreasing functions. The point of intersection is the equilibrium taste levels
zL∗1 and z
L∗
2 , from which equilibrium prices are calculated. In the lemma below,
we set conditions under which equilibrium occurs in certain regions.
68
Figure 3.1: Firm 1’s First Order Conditions
Lemma 3.2.4. Assuming z + IL ≥ ∆, let (2πL + πH)z + πLIL < z < (2πL +
2)z+(2πL+1)IL+πH∆, there exist a unique equilibrium where exactly 2 firms
will have positive market shares. The possible regions where the equilibrium lies
include Regions 1, 2, 5 and 6. Moreover, both low- and high-income markets
are covered (i.e., the equilibrium does not lie in Region 3, 4 or 7).
The equilibrium region depends on the values of the exogenous param-
eters. The general results for determining equilibrium region are stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.2.5. When z ∈ [(2πL+πH)z+πLIL, (2πL+πH)z+πLIL+3πL∆],
the equilibrium lies in Region 1. When z ∈ [(2πL+πH)z+πLIL+3πL∆, 2z+IL+
(3πL+πH)∆], the equilibrium lies in Region 5. When z ≥ 2z+IL+(3πL+πH)∆,
if V ≥ z+z+2IL−πH∆
3(z+IL)
, then the equilibrium lies in Region 2, otherwise it lies in
Region 6.
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)(z − z)− z − IL − 2∆]


















We derive the equilibrium indifference taste levels, prices, and revenues
in these different regions. This characterizes the market structure and prof-
itability given the economic conditions, in particular the consumer income
distribution within a period.






z − 2z − IL + (z − z)πHπL
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[z − πH∆− IL − 2z − (z + IL)(V − 1)]




This section describes the innovation race and firms’ innovation de-
cisions. Our setup follows the framework developed by Segal and Whinston
(2007) with the extension of heterogeneity of innovation costs across firms [40].
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There exist M firms who are potential entrants. Every period, they pick
up a draw ε from a distribution F (·). This draw affects the cost of innovation,
which is εc(φi(ε)). φi(ε) ∈ (0, 1) is the innovation rate of firm i with the draw
ε. c(·) is a concave function.
Potential entrants make decisions in three stages: 1) Entry to inno-
vation race - firms choose whether to innovate; 2) Innovation effort - firms
choose the level of R&D, which affects its probability to successfully innovate,
hence the chance of market entry; 3) In case of market entry, firms choose their
prices, which is described in the equilibrium results in the previous section.
Multiple innovators may succeed in developing new products. However,
only one of these innovations is granted a patent. The firm with a patent then
enters the product market and becomes an incumbent with the highest quality
product. We use the simultaneous entry and exit setup, thus the lowest-quality
incumbent is displace upon a new entry. The innovation model connects to
the market structure analysis at this point, as the profits of a new entrant is
characterized by the equilibrium results derived in Section 3.2.
If a firm chooses to innovate, it incurs a sunk innovation cost f . Let
πM(φ
I
−) denote the probability of a firm successfully creating a new product.
φI− ∈ [0, 1]M describes the innovation efforts of all the potential entrants.
However, each period only one of these firms is granted a patent and enters
the market, the probability of actually obtaining the patent is then denoted
by λM l(φ, φ−). φ− ∈ [0, 1]M−1 denotes the innovation efforts of the rest of
72
potential entrants2. The value functions of the firms at different stages are
listed below:
V 0(ε, φ−) = max{0,−f + V E(ε, φ−)} (3.12)
V E(ε, φ−) = maxφ{λM l(φ, φ−)V IJ + (1− λM l(φ, φ−))EV 0(ε′, φ′−)
−εc(φ)} (3.13)





+(1− πM l(φI−))[Ri + βV Ii (ε, φ−)] (3.14)
i = 2, ..., J
V I1 (ε, φ−) = πM l(φ−)EV
0(ε′, φ′−)
+(1− πM l(φ−))[R1 + βV I1 (ε, φ−)] (3.15)
V 0(ε, φ−) is the value function of firms at the start of the game; V
E(ε, φ−) is
the value function at Stage 1; V Ii (ε, φ−) and V
I
1 (ε, φ−) are the value functions
for incumbents producing product quality i and the lowest quality product
before exiting, respectively. It is easy to show that the dynamic programming
problem described by equations (3.12)-(3.15) satisfies the Blackwell sufficient
conditions, thus it has a unique fixed point in a bounded space.
Assuming ε ∈ {εl, εh} follows Bernoulli distribution, the probability of
drawing εh is η . For simplicity, let the number of firms facing low innovation
shocks in each period be M l (by the Law of Large Numbers M l ≈ (1− η)M).
2φh− and φ
l
− are other firms’ innovation efforts for a firm with high or low innovation
costs respectively.
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Following the formulation for multiple entrants case in Segal and Whinston’s
work [40], if both types of firms innovate, the probability of at least one firm
successfully creating a innovation is,
πM l(φ
I
−) = [1− (1− φ(εh))M−M
l
(1− φ(εl)Ml ] (3.16)
If only low-cost firms innovate,
πM l(φ
I
−) = [1− (1− φ(εl))M
l
] (3.17)
And in the former case, for any one firm, conditional on successful innovation,
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The equilibrium is the fixed point of the following correspondence:
φ(ε) = argmaxφ′∈[0,1]{0,−f + V E(ε, φ′)}
In the following section, we discuss the numerical solutions to the firm’s dy-
namic problem and derive insight on the impacts of different innovation policies
and aggregate economic conditions on innovation.
3.4 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In this section, we will discuss the parameterizations and the compara-
tive statics results based on the numerical analysis. First we show the change
in equilibrium innovation rate with respect to different types of income shocks.
And then the implications of public policies are discussed according to the re-
sults from varying sunk and variable innovation costs.
3.4.1 Parameterization
The aim of our analysis is to provide insight into the qualitative prop-
erties of equilibrium innovation rate under the effect of income shocks and
different types of innovation policies. Although some parameters are chosen
from standard values and previous literature, they are not based on data from
some specific industries.
The discount rate β = 0.95 implies the annual interest rate is approx-
imately 5%. a in the utility function is 1.2. The income per capital I is 0.9.
The relative high income qh is 1.11. We assume half of consumers have high
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income. The upper bound of taste shock z is 4.2, while the lower bound of
the taste shock z is 1.2. The sunk cost of innovation f is set to 5. As for the
functional form of innovation cost c(·), we follow Aghion, et al.’s model and
use quadratic form, c(ε) = εφ2 [1]. Firms with high variable innovation costs
have εh = 20. Firms with low variable innovation costs have εl = 12. We also
assume the number of potential entrants is 10 each period and the number of
firms with high innovation costs is 5. We set these numbers relatively small
to reduce the computation load.
With the above parameterizations, both types of firms conduct inno-
vation. The innovation rate for the firms with high innovation costs is 0.4641.
The innovation effort of the rest of firms is higher, 0.5964, as their innovation
costs are lower. The equilibrium prices fall in Region 2 in Section 3.4.2. If
we raise the lower bound of taste shock z to 2.2 and set a = 1.4, then the
equilibrium falls into Region 1. The firms with high innovation cost do not
innovate. The firms with low innovation cost now invest higher and have inno-
vation rate 0.7729. We discuss firms’ innovation behaviors in different regions
in the following.
3.4.2 Innovation and Income Shock
We study two types of income shocks in this part of the numerical
analysis, income inequality and income per capita. For income inequality, we
hold the per-capita income I fixed and vary the income gap. For income per
capita, we hold the income inequality fixed. These two experiments allow us
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Figure 3.2: Innovation & Income Inequality - Region 1
to isolate the effect of each of the two factors.
With respect to income inequality, holding the income per capita I
and proportion of low- and high-income segments, πh, πl fixed, we vary the
relative high income level qh to reflect the varying inequality. The results
contrast sharply between Region 1 and Region 2 (recalling that the region
where equilibrium falls is found endogenously by the parameter values that
characterize the consumer preference and income, and thus the prices set by
firms). In other words, varying income inequality within the range of the
region conditions allowed us to examine innovation in industries with certain
consumer preferences and yielded notably distinct results.
In Region 1 (see Figure 3.2), where low-income is segmented between
two products and high-income is solely captured by the higher quality firm, in-
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Figure 3.3: Innovation & Income Inequality - Region 2
creasing inequality has an adverse effect on both innovate rate and firm values.
The values of both types of firm decline with inequality due to reduced revenue.
This may appear counterintuitive, as one would expect steeper inequality to
benefit the higher-quality firm, which obtains the entire high-income segment
as well as part of the low-income segment. Our finding offers the opposite ex-
planation that with a wider income gap higher-quality firm actually lowers its
price in equilibrium in order to reach the low-income level while still gaining
the entirety of high-income segment. The aggregate innovation rate shows in-
significant change until the high-variable-cost firms drop out of the innovation
race, at which point the innovation rate declines significantly.
Region 2’s equilibrium results are independent of income inequality
shifts when the income per capita is held fixed, due to the condition that both
low- and high-income segments are shared between two firms. As a result,
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Figure 3.4: Innovation & Income per Capita - Region 1
both firm values and innovation rates are constant in income quality (see
Figure 3.3). This result is confirmed by the equilibrium profits in Table 3.2
where these profits are only related to I rather than qh.
We further analyze the impact of per-capita income on innovation while
holding fixed the income inequality parameter qh. The results for the two re-
gions look similar. Increasing per-capita income directly shifts the equilibrium
revenues. The value of the firms that have a low variable cost increases first,
where the high-variable-cost firms choose to not innovate; as the income level
rises further, the value of the low-variable-cost firms drops and then increases
in parallel with the high-variable cost firms (see Figures 3.4 & 3.5).
Thus, the improvement in overall income levels has three effects: 1) It
encourages high-variable-cost firms to enter the R&D race; and 2) It intensifies
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Figure 3.5: Innovation & Income per Capita - Region 2
competition and in turn shifts down low-variable-cost firms’ innovation rate; 3)
It induces higher innovation rate among the existing innovators. This is linked
to the increased demand and equilibrium profits in the product market where
the successful innovator enters. Even though increased competition shifts down
the equilibrium innovation rate of the low-variable-cost firms upon the entry
of the high-variable-cost firms, the aggregate innovation is increased.
Examination of different types of potential entrants reveals the under-
lying value gaps of the heterogeneous firms within the aggregate innovation
rate. The procyclicality of R&D is reaffirmed in the aggregate sense. On the
other hand, the argument that recession can also stimulate innovation is re-
flected in the first effect described above. The high-variable-cost firms drop
out of the R&D competition, thus reduced competition gives a boost to those
remaining in the R&D race.
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3.4.3 Innovation and Policy
We also look at the effects of varying the variable costs and sunk costs
of the innovating firms. We vary the variable costs proportionally, since the
heterogeneity resides in firms’ variable costs.
As Figure 3.6 shows, as the variable cost decreases (examining the x
axis from right to left) both the value and innovation rate increase for the low-
variable-cost firms, while the high-variable-cost firms do not innovate. Similar
to the previous observations with income per capita, further decreasing the
variable cost results in a drop of the value and innovation rate of the low-
variable-cost firms, as the high-variable-cost firms join the R&D race.
This result has an important R&D tax policy implication. R&D tax
incentives can be designed to lower firms’ R&D variable costs by providing
more tax cuts for more dollars spent on technology innovation. In effect, these
policies increase firms’ profits for more R&D activities. The similar three
effects as those observed with the income per capita are drawn here. And we
see that reducing variable R&D costs improves the aggregate innovation.
We also analyzed innovation rate against the innovation sunk cost,
which refers to the fixed cost to set up an R&D facility and purchase R&D
equipments, which may be applicable to start-up firms or those of small capac-
ity. It seems counterintuitive that increasing fixed cost can encourage innova-
tion rate. This finding is consistent for the low-variable-cost firms, whereas for
the high-variable-cost firms the innovation rate drops to zero when the fixed
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Figure 3.6: Innovation & Variable Costs
cost exceeds a certain threshold (see Figure 3.7).
The partially positive effect of fixed cost is due to that the firms in-
novate more intensely in order to achieve a higher probability of success to
offset the cost. However, above a certain threshold, the level of fixed cost
no longer justifies innovation decision for those with high variable costs, in
which case the high-variable-cost firms drop out of the R&D race, while the
low-variable-cost firms’ innovation rate has an upward jump caused by the
dampened competition and continues to rise at a low rate.
In the aggregate sense, the optimal innovation is achieved in the first
range when both types of firms innovate (see Figure 3.7). The insight here
is that subsidies for innovation may not stimulate R&D efforts, because the
innovating firms the incentives to compete in an attempt to recover the sunk
cost are diminished. In effect, firms become “lazier” as the profitability linked
with innovation effort is more easily achieved. Furthermore, when an industry
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Figure 3.7: Innovation & Fixed Costs
has a very high R&D sunk cost, only specialized or established firms that can
efficiently carry out R&D will compete in innovation.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the change in innovation rate given in-
come shocks to understand the innovation decision of firms under the impact
of business cycles. We further analyzed the innovation rate while varying
heterogeneous innovating firms’ sunk and variable R&D costs and derived im-
plications for innovation policies. Our formulation of a rich microfoundation
with the dynamic model has several major contributions: 1) Contrasting with
Segal and Whinston (2007) we provided an added dimension of business cycle
in the analysis of innovation rate; We are able to vary consumer income to find
firms’ R&D patterns through the fluctuation of business cycles; 2) Through
the market structure analysis, we found that equilibrium market segmentation
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is sensitive to consumer preferences; We in turn derived in-depth insights on
innovation and income inequality, which reached beyond the findings in [17]; 3)
We modeled multiple types of innovating firms in terms of their variable R&D
costs; the results on policies and innovation are consistent with the empirical
literature.
We found that effects of income shocks differ by varying either income
inequality and per-capita income while holding the other fixed. Under income
inequality change, the change in innovation rate has radically different results
conditional on the equilibrium region. In Region 1, when high-income seg-
ment only consumes high-quality good, the innovation rate is sensitive to the
inequality shock due to the asymmetry in market segmentation of the two
income levels. It decreases as income levels become more polarized, because
equilibrium revenues and prices are lowered to capture the poorer low-income
consumers. In Region 2, varying inequality has little effect since both low- and
high-income markets are segmented.
Increasing per-capita income has similar results in the two regions,
because firms’ equilibrium profits increase in both Region 1 and Region 2.
Raising the overall income levels has several effects. First, it encourages high-
variable-cost firm to enter the R&D race, because the profitability of the mar-
ket is increased. However, introducing more innovating firms intensifies com-
petition and reduces the other firms’ equilibrium innovation rate. Thus there
is a downward shift of the low-variable-cost firms’ innovation rate as more
firms enter the race. Regardless, the aggregate innovation rate increases with
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such a shock.
Our policy analysis showed consistent findings with the empirical ev-
idence that subsidies tend to have ambiguous effects on innovation, whereas
tax incentives have strongly positive impact. We provide the explanation that
subsidies often directly compensate firms’ sunk R&D costs, thus reduce the
premium that firms aim to recover through innovation success. While it mod-
erates innovation efforts, dampened competition may have a positive effect on
firms with lower variable costs. R&D tax credits reduce firms’ variable costs;
therefore, they continuously stimulate innovation efforts while encouraging en-





Proofs of Results in Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1.4.1.
Proof. i) Suppose p∗1 > p
∗
2, firms’ profit functions are
π1 = (p2 − p1 − α) ∗ p1
π2 = (1− p2 + p1 + α)p2 + β(1 + α)
The first order conditions are
p2 − 2p1 − α = 0
1− 2p2 + p1 + α = 0







If α < −1
2
, p∗1 > p
∗




(1− α)2, π∗2 =
1
9
(2 + α)2 + β(1 + α)
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ii) Now suppose p∗1 < p
∗
2.
π1 = (p2 − p1 − α) ∗ p1
π2 = (1− p2 + p1 + α)(p2 + β)
The first order conditions are
p2 − 2p1 − α = 0
1− 2p2 + p1 + α− β = 0







(1− β) + 1
3
α
But now 0 < p∗1 < p
∗
2 implies −12(1 − β) < α < 1 − β. The equilibrium
profits are π∗1 =
1
9
(1−β−α)2, π∗2 = 19(2+β+α)
2, π∗2−π∗1 = 13(1+2β+2α),
which is positive if α > −1
2
(1− β).




(1 + α − β), demand q∗2 = 12(1 + α + β) > 1. Since q
∗
2 is at
most 1, p∗2 ≥ α. From the concavity of π2 and 12(1 +α−β) ≤ α, we infer
that p∗2 = α.
iv) For −1
2
≤ α ≤ −1
2
(1− β), the only possible case is that p∗1 = p∗2 = p.
In this case, firms’ profit functions are
π1 = −αp
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π2 = (1 + α)(p+ β)
Let’s check if firm 1 deviates. ∀ε > 0, if p1 = p + ε, then π̃1 = (−ε −
α)(p+ ε),
π̃1 − π1 = −ε(p+ ε+ α)
so if p+ α ≥ 0, π̃1 − π1 < 0, firm 1 will not charge higher price.
If p1 = p− ε, then π̃1 = (ε− α)(p− ε),
π̃1 − π1 = ε(p− ε+ α)
so if p+α ≤ 0, π̃1−π1 < 0, firm 1 will not charge lower price. Therefore,
if p = −α, then firm 1 will not deviate.
Now let’s check if firm 2 deviates at p = −α. If p2 = −α + ε, then
π̃2 = (1− ε+ α)(−α + ε+ β),
π̃2 − π2 = ε(1− ε+ 2α− β)
since α ≤ −1
2
(1− β), we have 1 + 2α − β ≤ 0, thus π̃2 − π2 < 0, firm 2
will not charge higher price.
If p2 = −α− ε, then π̃2 = (1 + ε+ α)(−α− ε) + β(1 + α),
π̃2 − π2 = ε(−1− ε− 2α)
since α ≥ −1
2
, we have −2α − 1 ≤ 0, thus π̃2 − π2 < 0, firm 2 will not
charge lower price.
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Therefore, p∗1 = p
∗
2 = −α is a unique equilibrium within this case. The
equilibrium profits are π∗1 = α
2, π∗2 = (1 + α)(β − α). Since 1 + α >
−α > 0, β − α > −α > 0, then (1 + α)(β − α) > α2.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.2.




(1− α) > 1
3





≤ α ≤ −1
2
(1− β), p∗1 = p∗2 = α.
For −1
2




For α ≥ 1− β, p∗2 > p∗1.
Therefore, in equilibrium, p∗1 > p
∗
2 if α < −12 , and p
∗
1 ≤ p∗2 otherwise.
ii) For α < −1
2
, π∗2 − π∗1 =
1+2α+3β(1+α)
3
, which is positive if α > 1
2+3β
− 1.
As shown in the proof for Lemma 1.4.1, for −1
2
(1 − β) < α < 1 − β,
π∗2 −π∗1 = 13(1 + 2β+ 2α) > 0; and for −
1
2




For α > 1− β, π∗2 = α + β is clearly > 0.
Therefore, π∗2 > π
∗




Proof of Lemma 1.4.3.
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Proof. Suppose p∗1 < p
∗
2, then firms’ profit functions are as follows:
π1 = (p2 − p1 − α)p1
π2 = (1− p2 + p1 + α)(p2 + β)
We can see that this case is exactly the same as the mandatory case for α >
−1
2
(1− β) (see the proof for Lemma 1.4.1).
For α ≤ −1
2
(1 − β), if p∗1 > p∗2, all consumers will purchase from firm
2, while firm 1 has no market share. So firm 1 would lower its price. Firm 2’s
profit is π2 = p2 + β(1 + α), so it has incentive to raise its price. Therefore,
there is no pure strategy equilibrium for p1 > p2.
Now check if p1 = p2 = p is an equilibrium. If p > 0, firm 2 has incentive
to lower its price to undercut firm 1. But for p = 0, neither firm has incentive
to deviate. So p1 = p2 = 0 is the unique equilibrium for α ≤ −12(1− β).
Proof of Proposition 1.4.4.
Proof. By comparing firm 2’s profits under mandatory and optional strategies,
it is clear that for α ≤ −1
2
(1 − β), mandatory strategy yields higher profits;
for other values of α, profits are identical. So mandatory strategy is weakly
dominant for firm 2.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.5.
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Proof. It follows straightforward from the perfect substitutability of two firms’
services and advertisements that consumers are indifferent between the offer-
ings of the two firms, when they choose the same advertising strategies. The
Bertrand competition results in zero price. As firms evenly split the market,
they make equal advertising revenue 1
2
β(1− α).
Proof of Lemma 1.4.6.
Proof. Suppose p∗1 > p
∗
2. Since π1 = 0, π2 = p2 +β(1 +α), firm 1 has incentive
to lower its price, while firm 2 has incentive to raise price, so this is not an
equilibrium.
Suppose p∗1 < p
∗
2. Now π1 = (1 − p1 + p2 + α)p1 + β(1 + α), π2 =






So p∗2 > p
∗
1 if α < −12 .
For α ≥ −1
2
, p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p is the only possible equilibrium. It’s easy to
verify that if p > 0, firm 1 has incentive to undercut. But if p = 0, both firms






Proof of Proposition 1.4.7.
Proof. First we show that 1
9
(1− α)2 > 1
2
β(1 + α), or equivalently, ∆ = 2(1−
α)2 − 9β(1 + α) > 0. Since ∂∆
∂α
= 4α− (4 + 9β) < 0, it is enough to show that
∆ > 0 at α = −1
2






β > 0 holds. So, given
that a firm chooses mandatory advertising, the other firm’s best response is
optional advertising.
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We also need to show that 1
9
(2 + α)2 + β(1 + α) > 1
2
β(1 + α), which
always holds since 1 + α > 0 and β > 0. Thus, given that a firm chooses
optional advertising, the other firm’s best response is mandatory advertising.
So for α < −1
2
, the equilibrium would be one firm chooses mandatory
strategy and the other firm chooses optional strategy.
Proof of Lemma 1.5.1.




β(1 +α) and 1
9
(2 +α)2 +β(1 +α) >
1
2
β(1 + α), for α < −1
2
. From Table A.1, we can derive the pure-strategy
equilibria to be (M,N), (N,M), (M,O), and (O,M).
Firm 2
N M O
N 0, 0 19 (1− α)
2, 19 (2 + α)
2 + β(1 + α) 0, β(1 + α)
Firm 1 M 19 (2 + α)






9 (2 + α)
2 + β(1 + α), 19 (1− α)
2
O β(1 + α), 0 19 (1− α)
2, 19 (2 + α)
2 + β(1 + α) 12β(1 + α),
1
2β(1 + α)
Table A.1: Payoff Matrix for α < −1
2
Proof of Lemma 1.5.2.




Let ∆(α) = α2 − 1
2
β(1 + α). When β < 1
3
, ∆(α) > 0 for the current α
range (see Table A.2). Thus, when −1
2
≤ α ≤ −1
2
(1 − β), the pure-strategy
equilibria are (N,M), (M,N), and (O,O).









(1− β)) > 0 and ∆((1− β)) < 0, for an α∗ ∈ (−1
2
(1− β), (1− β)],
when −1
2
(1 − β) < α ≤ α∗, the pure-strategy equilibria are (M,N), (N,M),
(N,O), (O,N).
Based on Table A.4, we get when α > α∗, the pure-strategy equilibria
are (M,M), (M,O), (O,M) and (O,O).
Firm 2
N M O
N 0, 0 α2, (β − α)(1 + α) 0, β(1 + α)














Table A.2: Payoff Matrix for −1
2
< α ≤ −1
2
(1− β)
Proof of Lemma 1.5.3.






N 0, 0 19 (1− α− β)
2, 19 (2 + α + β)
2 1
9 (1− α− β)
2, 19 (2 + α + β)
2
Firm 1 M 19 (2 + α + β)









O 19 (2 + α + β)









Table A.3: Payoff Matrix for −1
2
(1− β) < α ≤ (1− β)
Firm 2
N M O
N 0, 0 0, α+ β 0, α+ β














Table A.4: Payoff Matrix for α > (1− β)
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(1− β)], when −1
2
≤ α ≤ α∗∗, the pure-strategy
equilibria are (N,M), (M,N), and (O,O) (See Table A.2).
Now refer to Table A.3, and let ∆(α) = 1
9
(1 − α − β)2 − 1
2
β(1 + α).
When β > 1
3
, ∆(α) < 0 for all α in this range. Thus, based on Table A.4, when
α > α∗∗, the pure-strategy equilibria are (M,O), (O,M), (M,M), (O,O).
Proof of Proposition 1.5.4.
Proof. Clearly, when the equilibrium strategies are (M,M), (M,O), (O,M), and
(O,O), N is a dominated strategy and M is a weakly dominant strategy. From
Lemma 5 and 6, we obtain the conditions that β < 1
3
and α > α∗, or β > 1
3
and α > α∗∗, such dominance occurs.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.5.
Proof. From Table A.2, we can see that optional advertising is weakly domi-
nated by mandatory advertising for this range of α.
Proof of Proposition 1.6.1.
Proof. i) Suppose p∗1 > p
∗
2, firms’ profit functions are
π1 = (p2 − p1 − α)p1
π2 = (1− p2 + p1 + α)p2 + β(1 + α) + b(p1 − p2)
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The first order conditions are
p2 − 2p1 − α = 0
1− 2p2 + p1 + α− b = 0





2 + α− 2b
3
If max{−1,−2(1 − b)} < α < −1
2





(1− α− b)2, π∗2 =
1
9
{(2 + α)2 + b2}+ β(1 + α)− 1
9
(5 + 7α)b
ii) When b ≥ 1
2
, we get −1 ≤ −2(1 − b). For −1 ≤ α ≤ −2(1 − b), p∗2
is driven down to 0. Maximizing π1 = (−p1 − α)p1 yields p∗1 = −12α,
q∗1 = −12α, and q
∗






α2, π∗2 = β(1 + α)− 12αb.
Proof of Proposition 1.6.2.
Proof. We focus on the case when b ≥ 1
2
.























N 0, 0 1
4
α2, β(1 + α)− 1
2
αb 0, β(1 + α)










β(1 + α)− 1
2





O β(1 + α), 0 1
4












β(1 + α) > 0
thus “M” is a dominant strategy for both firms. The only equilibrium is
(M,M).
ii) For −2(1 − b) < α ≤ −1
2
(1 − b), the payoff matrix of firm 1 and firm 2
is as follows:





N 0, 0 π∗N , π
∗
M 0, β(1 + α)






















[(2 + α)2 + b2] + β(1 + α)− 1
9







β(1 + α)− 1
2
αb.
We show that “M” is a dominant strategy.
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0, it is enough to show that ∆ ≥ 0 at α = −2(1 − b). Since 1
2
≤ b ≤ 1,
∆|α=−2(1−b) = (2b− 1)(1− b+ 12β) ≥ 0 holds.
Second, we have shown in the proof of Proposition 2 that 1
9
{(2 + α)2 +
b2}+ β(1 +α)− 1
9
(5 + 7α)b > β(1 +α), so 1
9
{(2 +α)2 + b2}+ β(1 +α)−
1
9
(5 + 7α)b > 1
2
β(1 + α) holds.




(1− b) < α ≤ −1
2
(1− β), the payoff matrix of firm 1 and firm 2
is as follows:
Table A.7: Payoff Matrix for −1
2





N 0, 0 α2, (β − α)(1 + α) 0, β(1 + α)
Firm 1 M (β − α)(1 + α), α2 1
2








β(1 + α), 1
2
β(1 + α)
O β(1 + α), 0 1
2
β(1 + α), 1
2
β(1 + α) 1
2
β(1 + α), 1
2
β(1 + α)
Clearly, (β − α)(1 + α) > β(1 + α) and 1
2





We also have 1
2
β(1 + α) − 1
2
αb − α2 = 1
2
β(1 + α) − 1
2
α(b + 2α). Since
α > −1
2
(1− b)⇒ 2α + b > 2b− 1 > 0, then 1
2
β(1 + α)− 1
2
αb > α2





(1 − β) < α ≤ 0, the payoff matrix of firm 1 and firm 2 is as
follows:
Table A.8: Payoff Matrix for −1
2
(1− β) < α ≤ 0
Firm 2
N M O
N 0, 0 19 (1− α− β)
2, 19 (2 + α + β)
2 1
9 (1− α− β)
2, 19 (2 + α + β)
2
Firm 1 M 19 (2 + α + β)













O 19 (2 + α + β)









Note that β ≥ b ≥ 1
2
. Let ∆(α) = 1
2
β(1 + α) − 1
9







(1 − α − β) > 0. Since ∆(−1
2




















Thus “M” is a weakly dominant strategy and there are two equilibria
(M,M) and (O,O).
In summary, when b ≥ 1
2
, “M” is a weakly dominant strategy for both
firms. For α < −1
2
(1−b), the unique equilibrium is (M,M) ; for α ≥ −1
2
(1−b),
the equilibria are (M,M) and (O,O). So (M,M) is always one of the equilibria.
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Appendix B
Proofs of Results in Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1.
Proof. First, it is never optimal for a bidder to bid higher than his/her true
unit-valuation. If one can win by bidding the true unit valuation, then there
is nothing to gain by bidding higher. Otherwise, winning would necessarily
result in a negative payoff, since the bidder would have to pay a price above
his valuation. Second, for bidder j with unit-valuation v, bidding less than v
is weakly dominated by bidding v. Let s−j denote the highest score among
the remaining bidders. If j can win with b < v, it does so as well with b = v
and without paying more (since by the second-score rule, j pays for his/her
yield at the unit price
s−j
q̂j
). If j does not win with b, it will get zero payoff.
It can get at least the same amount by bidding his/her true unit-valuation.
Thus bidding one’s true valuation is the weakly dominant strategy.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1.
Proof. From (2.3), if q1 > q0, ∆(k2) increases in k2. If Delta(0) ≥ 0, it is
optimal for the advertiser to stretch and k∗ = 0. If ∆(0) < 0, there exists k∗
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such that ∆(k∗) = 0. So, for k2 ≥ k∗, ∆(k2) ≥ 0 . Thus it is optimal for the
advertiser to stretch. Similar analysis holds for the case with q1 < q0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2.
Proof. From (2.3), if q1 > q0, it is easy to verify that ∆(q2) increases in q2;
and there must exist q∗2 such that, for q2 ≥ q∗2, ∆(q2) ≥ 0. As a result, for any
q2 ≥ q∗2, it is optimal for the advertiser to stretch. Due to the monotonicity of
∆(q2), the bigger q2, the more gain from stretching. For the case with q1 < q0,
increase in q2 has negative impact on the new market but positive impact on
the primary market; so there is no conclusive effect.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3.




H ′1(s)|(q2+ε)t −H ′1(s)|(q2−ε)t
]
tdt. In the
case with convex H1(s), H
′
1(s)|(q2+ε)t > H ′1(s)|(q2−ε)t since H ′1(s) increases in s
by the definition of convexity. So ∆′(ε) > 0 and thus ∆ increases in ε. In the
case with concave H1(s), ∆ decreases in ε.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.1.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.5.1.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.2.
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Proof. Proof: In the case with H1(s) = H2(s), ∆ = 0.5(k2q2 − q1)D2(q1, q2).
Denote q∗2 as the solution to k2q2−q1 = 0 and q∗∗2 as the solution to D2(q1, q2) =
0. Let qU2 = max{q∗2, q∗∗2 }. For any q2 > qU2 (q1), ∆ < 0 since k2q2−q1 increases
in q2 and D2(q1, q2) decrease in q2. Similarly, q
L
2 = min{q∗2, q∗∗2 }, for any
q2 < q
L
2 (q1), ∆ < 0. In both cases, it is optimal for the advertiser not to
stretch.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.3.




H ′1(s)|(q2+ε)t −H ′1(s)|(q2−ε)t
]
tdt.
In the case with convex H1(s), H
′
1(s)|(q2+ε)t > H ′1(s)|(q2−ε)t by the definition of
convexity. So, if q1 > k2q2, ∆
′(ε) > 0 and thus ∆ increases in ε. If q1 < k2q2,
∆ decreases in ε .
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Appendix C
Proofs of Results in Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1.
Proof. Equation (2) - Equation (1) is positive, thus part 1 follows.




k for all k.
From Equation (2), part 3 follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.2.
Proof. Equation (4) can be rewritten as ∀j ∈ {L,H},z
L
k+1 − 2πLzLk − πHz − πH∆− πLIL − pk(C − 1)− πLpk−1(C − 1) = 0, zHk ≤ z
zLk+1 − 2zLk − IL − pk(Ck+1 − 1)− pk−1(Ck − 1) = 0, zHk ≥ z.
Since Ck > 1 ∀k, we get ∀j ∈ {L,H},
zjk+1 > 2z
j
k + Ij (C.1)
zjk+1 > 2πLz
j
k + πHz + πH∆ + πLIj (C.2)
From Equation (2), we have
z − 2zLn − IL + πH∆− (Cn − 1)pn−1 = 0
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From here we derive the following condition:
z > 2zLn + IL − πH∆
From Conditions (C.1), it follows that
z > 4zLn−1 + 3IL − πH∆
z > 8zLn−2 + 7IL − πH∆
...
z > 2NzLn−(N−1) + (2
N − 1)IL − πH∆
And by Condition (C.2),
z > 4πLz
L
n−1 + (2πL + 1)IL + 2πHz + πH∆
z > 8πLz
L






N−1 − 1)IL + 2N−1πHz + πH∆
By the assumption that z < min{2Nz + (2N − 1)IL − πH∆, (2N−1πL +
2)z + (2N−1πL + 2
N−1 − 1)IL + πH∆}, we get z > zLn−(N−1).
We conclude that for any Nash equilibrium, given z < min{2Nz+(2N−
1)IL − πH∆, (2N−1πL + 2)z + (2N−1πL + 2N−1 − 1)IL + πH∆}, at most the N
firms producing products of qualities n, n − 1, n − (N − 1),..., hold positive
market shares.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2.3.
Proof. The proof for Proposition 2 follows immediately from that of Lemma
3.2.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.4.
Proof. Since (10) is increasing and (11) is decreasing, two equations intersect









If the above is greater than z, then the condition is satisfied. Thus, we have
z ≥ (2πL + πH)z + πLIL. We can also verify that the second order conditions
of the profit functions are satisfied, such that both (10) and (11) are concave
in p1 and p2, respectively, with the other price fixed.
If the FOCs are to intersect in Region 3, Equation (11) at zL1 = z must
lie above z + πH∆ + (z + IL)(V − 1 + πL). From here we derive that
1
2
[z + πH∆− IL − (z + IL)(V − 1)] ≥ z + πH∆ + (z + IL)(V − 1 + πL)
V ≤ z − πH∆ + z + 2IL − 2πL(z + IL)
3(z + IL)
Given the condition from Proposition 1, z < (2πL + 2)z+ (2πL + 1)IL) +πH∆,
we have V < 1. The above condition cannot be satisfied, because V > 1;
Thus, the equilibrium does not occur in Region 3 or above, which also includes
Regions 4 and 7. The two firms’ FOCs will intersect in Region 1, 2, 5, or 6,
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given the condition 2πL+πH)z+πLIL < z < (2πL+2)z+(2πL+1)IL)+πH∆.
And a unique equilibrium exists under this condition.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.5.
Proof. From the sets of FOCs (10) and (11), we can easily derive z∗1 and z
∗
2
for Regions 1, 2, 5 and 6, and then directly determine equilibrium prices and
profits from Equations (3), (4), (8) and (9). The expressions are listed in
Tables 1 & 2. Since in Region 1, zL∗2 − ∆ ≤ z, we have z ≤ (2πL − πH)z +
πLIL + 3πL∆; for Region 2, z ≤ zL∗2 − ∆, solve the inequality will give us
z ≥ 2z + IL + (3πL + πH)∆. And the range between them indicates Region 5.
For Region 6, we can easily find the condition for V from the boundary points
of Region 2 and 3.
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